Author: Natalia Doboš
Affiliation: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
Email: nata.dobos@seznam.cz
Language: English
Issue: 2/2021
Pages: 118–149 (32 pages)
Keywords: Yazidis, Germany, ethnic identity, diaspora, genocide, migration, integration
Abstract
This paper deals with an ethnic-religious minority whose members call themselves Yazidis. The aim of the work is to examine how the adaptation of the Yazidis emigrating to Germany, the process of integration into the majority society seems to be successful and how, despite their will to integrate, they try to guard and preserve their ethnic identity and culture. The theoretical part contains a branch anchoring of the topic and an explanation of key concepts such as ethnic identity, diaspora, Yazidism and etymology of the word. The practical part acquaints the reader more closely with the mysterious and closed society after centuries, which begins to reveal itself to the world only in the last decade. In the practical part of the work are interpreted qualitative data collected from field research, which the author carried out in two trips to Germany at the end of September 2020 and early January 2021. For data collection was used the method of qualitative research. The method of participatory observation was applied to data collection, in which the researcher lived in a traditional Yazidi family and participated in daily routine.
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Introduction
The Yazidis are an ethno-religious minority who, until 2014, remained almost entirely unknown to the European public. Until that year, the largest Yazidi population resided in northern Iraq, near the city of Mosul. Regrettably, this ethnic group only became widely recognised among scholars and the public following the massacre perpetrated against them by the terrorist organisation known as the Islamic State, which has been active in the Middle East since 2014 and, to some extent, continues to operate to this day. The Yazidis’ distinctive religion and the specific organisation of their community render them one of the least explored minorities in the Middle East. At the same time, they are considered among the most endangered, having, according to the United Nations, been victims of genocide committed by the aforementioned terrorist organisation.[1]
Beyond Iraq, Yazidi minorities also live in Turkey, Syria, Georgia, and Armenia. A Yazidi community emerged in Russia and the Caucasus in the 19th century, following emigration from the Ottoman Empire where Yazidis faced mass extermination or forced conversion to Islam. During the 1990s, a significant Yazidi diaspora was established in Germany, which expanded considerably over the past decade due to the mass exodus that occurred between 2014 and 2016. Today, the Yazidi diaspora in Germany comprises over 200,000 individuals.[2] The majority of them originate from Iraq and Syria, although a portion of the community comes from the Caucasus, particularly from Armenia. The Yazidi community is highly insular and cohesive, and thus tends to concentrate in just a few urban areas, even within the diaspora.
This study seeks to capture the changes that the Yazidi community has had to confront following their emigration to Europe, predominantly to Germany. The Yazidis endeavour to preserve their cultural values and maintain their ethnic identity. Family values are of particular importance to the Yazidis. Researchers have observed that even after emigration to Europe, at least the first and second generations continue to live within traditional family structures, whereby the woman is responsible for the household and child-rearing, while the husband works to provide for the family. Some asylum seekers brought one of their parents with them to Germany, typically their widowed mothers. It is already evident that future generations will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their ethnic identity for a variety of reasons. Firstly, these generations are growing up—or were even born—in Germany, meaning that they attend nurseries and schools there and consequently spend more time in these institutions than at home. They establish relationships with German peers and other migrants and will, in time, develop critical thinking skills that will lead them to question traditional norms. It is likely that certain customs and traditions will, within the European cultural context, come to seem bizarre or at the very least foreign.
The aim of this study is to examine the adaptation of the Yazidis in Germany, the transformation of this ethnic minority’s way of life following emigration, the process of integration into the majority society, and the extent to which they have been able to preserve their culture and identity within the European context. To achieve this aim, the following research questions were posed:
- How did the Yazidi diaspora in Germany come into existence?
- What are the main reasons for Yazidi emigration to Europe?
- How do Yazidis maintain their culture within the German majority society?
- Are Yazidis subjected to any form of discrimination when seeking employment in Germany?
- Who sponsors the various Yazidi associations that have been established?
- What are the principal attributes of Yazidi identity?
For the purpose of data collection, the method of semi-structured interviews was employed, allowing respondents the space for free yet relevant narration. A total of six interviews were conducted, one of which involved the participation of an entire family, thereby enabling partial application of the focus group method. The practical part of this study also draws on field research carried out in German regions where significant portions of the Yazidi diaspora reside. Specifically, this involved the town of Gladenbach, located in the western part of the Marburg-Biedenkopf district in Hesse, and the town of Oerlinghausen in North Rhine-Westphalia, where Yazidis live in the Lippe district. The field research lasted a total of 19 days, during which the author lived with a Yazidi family originating from Iraq. Two research trips to Germany were undertaken as part of the study.
Literature Review
The Yazidi minority is described in a narrative manner in Birgül Açikyildiz’s book The Yezidis. This publication provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to Yazidi history, the ethnic origins of the community, its culture, religious beliefs, and social structure. As this community has for centuries remained overshadowed by other religions and ethnic minorities, such as Islam and the Kurds, this book presents the first research findings that cover the full historical and geographical scope of Yazidism. Yazidism is practised not only in northern Iraq, from which Yazidis primarily trace their origins—particularly in the Lalesh valley, the site of the most sacred Yazidi pilgrimage locations—but also in Turkey, Syria, and the Caucasus. The book further addresses the role of women within Yazidi society and the relationships between Yazidis and other communities such as Assyrians, Muslim Kurds, and Christians. The publication offers a thorough account of the religious elements that make Yazidism an independent and unique religion, often incomprehensible to the Islamic world.[3]
The Yazidi community is also vividly introduced to readers through Nadia Murad’s book The Last Girl. This work offers the testimony of a young woman who survived the Yazidi genocide in Iraq in 2014. After the destruction of her native village, she was sold as a sex slave to fighters of the Islamic State, from whom she eventually managed to escape. Nadia later reached Germany, where she became an activist and a prominent advocate for Yazidi rights.[4]
The reasons for the emigration of this persecuted group to Europe are addressed by Karel Černý in his book Jezídové – komunita na útěku. Several factors underpin this emigration. The principal catalyst for the displacement of Yazidis from Iraq was the genocide perpetrated by the Islamic State, which led to the flight of more than half a million Yazidis to Kurdistan and the emigration of tens of thousands to Germany and Sweden. Yazidis settled in Kurdistan typically face four possible futures: to emigrate to Europe, to return to Iraq—to Sinjar or Bahzani—to attempt assimilation in Kurdistan, or to remain indefinitely in the unbearable conditions of refugee camps. One of the most severe issues in these camps is the lack of infrastructure; refugees also suffer from the absence of water, toilets, and showers. Furthermore, inhabitants contend with a lack of services and life opportunities, as the camps are often situated far from surrounding communities, services, and employment prospects.
A clear phenomenon is observable, whereby one wave of refugees acts as a trigger for the next. As outlined above, the phenomenon of ‚brain drain‘ is also evident, whereby teachers, doctors, and the middle class emigrate first. This demographic assumes that, thanks to their education and financial resources, they will adapt more successfully and swiftly in their new environment. The departure of the middle class results in a reduction in services and the creation of employment opportunities for the remaining community, prompting others, faced with worsening economic conditions, to contemplate emigration, even if they had originally intended to remain in their homeland. The demonstrative effect of other migrant groups is also apparent; Yazidis often draw inspiration from Syrian refugees who fled to northern Iraq, spent several months in refugee camps, and subsequently continued onwards to Europe. The process of chain migration is likewise evident, as refugees increasingly migrate to join family members already settled in Europe, aiding one another through the exchange of information, financial support, or assistance in finding employment.
Since the 1990s, Germany has become the centre of the Yazidi diaspora. According to estimates from 2016, over 60,000 Yazidis from Turkey, Armenia, and Iraq were residing there at that time. The question of how Yazidis attempt to integrate while simultaneously striving to preserve their culture is addressed in a chapter dedicated to Yazidis in the book Ve stínu islámu – menšinová náboženství na Blízkém východě by Jiří Gebelt and his co-authors. Yazidis establish associations that provide for cultural and religious activities as well as communication with authorities and the media. Since 2014, these associations have also sought to provide psychological care for women who were subjected to sexual enslavement by the Islamic State.
Yazidism is not merely a religion; it defines the Yazidi minority as a whole. It is not a proselytising religion, and its members show no interest in its dissemination. This faith is closely tied to its geographic roots; hence, due to the intense migration of Yazidis in recent years, there is a risk of gradual erosion of religious commitment among the younger generations, who are now being born or at least raised in Europe. The question of differing perceptions of religion between Yazidi migrants raised in their homeland and those socialised predominantly within the diaspora is explored by Greyenbroek in his work Yezidism in Europe: Different Generations Speak about their Religion.[5]
Since the mid-19th century, Yazidism has fascinated and provoked a number of Western scholars, though genuine knowledge of Yazidi tradition has remained relatively limited. At the close of the 20th century, a collection of Yazidi sacred hymns was published; these had previously been transmitted solely orally and had not existed in written form until the late 1970s. The texts contained in Philip Greyenbroek’s Yezidism – Its Background, Observances and Textual Tradition offer a detailed perspective on the faith, its background, and its observances. The first half of the volume analyses earlier works on Yazidism and provides an insight into the history of the religions of Iranian peoples. The second part consists of translations of 19 Yazidi hymns, accompanied by commentary on philological and theological points.[6]
Yazidism
The Yazidi religion was traditionally transmitted orally, and its defining features reflect this oral nature. Myths, folk legends, and hymns have been passed down for centuries by religious authorities and by kawwals (religious musicians) from one generation to the next. Although certain sacred texts were first published at the beginning of the twentieth century, and some Arabic and Syriac sources refer to events from the time when the Yazidi community first emerged, there is virtually no recorded information concerning the history and beliefs of the earliest Yazidis.[7]
Etymology
The etymology of the term “Yazidi” is somewhat contested. Some scholars argue that the word derives from the Middle Persian and Kurdish Jazadu, meaning “God”, or from Izid / Izad, which in modern Persian signifies “Angel”. The root “Jaz” conveys the meanings “to worship” or “to venerate” and evolves into the noun “jazata” – “a being worthy of worship”, “a holy being”, or “a being worthy of sacrifice”. Some academics suggest that Yazidis trace their name to the Zoroastrian city of Yazd in Iran, where fire is still revered, referencing “Ahura Mazda” or “Ohrmazd”, the principle of good in opposition to “Angra Mainyu” or “Ahriman”, the principle of evil.[8]
Another theory claims that the Yazidis derive their name from the Umayyad caliph Yazid ibn Mu’awiya, who ruled from 680 to 683 CE and was responsible for the death of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Husayn ibn Ali. Following the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in 750 CE, descendants of the royal family and other Umayyad sympathisers fled to the Kurdish mountains to escape the rival Abbasid Caliphate. They were received there by the Kurds, who pledged their loyalty to them. This theory concludes that Umayyad refugees intermarried with the Kurds and jointly celebrated Yazid ibn Mu’awiya as their ancestor and former ruler.[9]
Yazidis refer to themselves as Ezid, Ezi, or Izid, as well as Dasini or Dasin, which supposedly links them to the Nestorian Christian dioceses of Daseni or Dasaniyat. Another Christian tradition suggests that the Yazidis were originally Christians whose faith later evolved. There is substantial evidence of Yazidism’s origins in Christianity, as certain Yazidi rituals derive from Christian traditions, such as baptism or the consumption of alcohol. To support these claims, locals assert that Sheikh Adi was none other than Addai – the legendary Christian apostle of Mesopotamia. This notion references the fact that Sheikh Adi’s sanctuary in Lalish was originally a monastery.[10] The most commonly cited version within the Yazidi public discourse asserts that Yazidism is the oldest religion in the Middle East. Yazidis claim that the entire Kurdish population was once Yazidi until repression and massacres forced conversions to Islam. Only a small number resisted and remained faithful to their original religion – Yazidism.
Ethnic Identity
The term ethnic identity is used to express sameness, likeness, and unity. More precisely, identity signifies “the similarity of a person or thing under all circumstances; the condition or fact of being itself and not something else”.[11] Ethnic identity is typically an affiliative construct, whereby an individual is regarded as belonging to a specific ethnic or cultural group. Such affiliation may be influenced by racial, natal, symbolic, and cultural factors.[12] Yazidi ethnic identity is defined primarily by religious affiliation and strict endogamy.
Diaspora. One of the consequences of emigration, the diffusion of cultural elements, and globalisation processes is the emergence of diasporas worldwide. A diaspora refers to an ethnic group of people who, for a particular reason, emigrate from their homeland but strive to preserve their culture and roots.[13] Until the 1980s, the term diaspora was associated with the negative consequences arising from forced migration. From the 1980s onwards, there has been a gradual departure from this perception of diaspora as shaped solely by violent exile caused by external factors.[14] Early theories of diasporas argued that following resettlement, migrants permanently sever ties with their country of origin.[15] Modern conceptions, by contrast, take into account the preservation of ethnic identities and the maintenance of lasting connections with the homeland. In the present day, as a consequence of globalisation, diasporas based on ethnic identity are increasingly forming and are often characterised by their closed nature. However, there are no clear boundaries stipulating how many generations must demonstrate their ethnic origin to qualify as diaspora members, and therefore self-identification is often deemed sufficient.
History
Few peoples in the world possess a history that stretches back several millennia. The Yazidis are among this select group. The origins of the Yazidis remain ambiguous for scholars. Three principal theories exist: – Yazidis as direct descendants of the Babylonians; – Yazidis as direct descendants of the Sumerians; – Yazidis as migrants from India who emigrated to northern Iraq. It should be noted that none of these theories is substantiated by scientific evidence. However, academic literature predominantly regards the areas of Mosul and Sinjar in northern Iraq—where the majority of Yazidis lived until recently—as their homeland.[16]
Yazidis in Iraq and Turkey
The earliest references to the Yazidis appear in chronicles as late as the twelfth century. A contemporary of Sheikh Adi, Kitab al-Ansab, mentions a community known as al-Yazidiya in northern Mosul.[17] In the twelfth century, Sheikh Adi and his followers from the Adawiyya brotherhood settled in northern Iraq, where they encountered a rural community whose beliefs were a syncretic blend of ancient Iranian traditions, such as Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism. These people worshipped the caliph Yazid ibn Mu’awiya. Over time, the locals were influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Adi and his order. However, the beliefs and practices of the Yazidis also began to influence the doctrines of the Adawiyya order, whose members originally followed Islam. The continuing syncretism between Sufi Islam and ancient Iranian religious traditions resulted in a synthesis of belief which eventually separated the religion of Sheikh Adi’s followers from orthodox Islam.
In the fourteenth century, Yazidism spread through the region of Suleymania, now part of Kurdistan, reaching as far west as Antalya in Turkey. Yazidism became the official religion of the semi-autonomous principality of Jazira. As the political influence of the Yazidis grew in the early fifteenth century, Muslims became increasingly brutal towards the followers of Sheikh Adi, whom they regarded as apostates and worshippers of Yazid. Forced conversions to Islam and massacres of those who resisted became commonplace.
Unlike in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when they were united and powerful, from the fifteenth century onwards the Yazidis survived as small tribal groups. Some influential leaders of Yazidi tribes were forcibly converted to Islam, and Yazidi power rapidly diminished.[18]
From the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman authorities launched extensive persecutions of non-Muslim communities. As a result, large numbers of Yazidis from Karadag and Rumkale fled and joined the Yazidi populations in northern Syria and Iraq. Armenian Christians and Christians from Eastern churches also fled to the province of Sinjar, where they sought refuge among the Yazidis.[19]
Following the declaration of Kurdish autonomy in 1992, Yazidis began to integrate into broader Kurdish society with the support of the two main Kurdish political parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan — which granted the Yazidis a form of symbolic religious freedom as followers of an ancient Kurdish religion. For example, the Lalish Cultural Centre was established in 1993 in Duhok. Yazidis were allowed to publish several journals on historical, cultural, and religious topics. Yazidi religion began to be taught in schools. The community has been restoring ancient Yazidi monuments and constructing new ones. Nevertheless, many Yazidis remain dissatisfied with the current Kurdish government, believing that Kurdish parties recognise the Yazidis merely to advance their own political interests.[20]
Yazidis in Syria
The Yazidis in Syria inhabit two areas in the north of the country around the cities of Afrin and Jebel Siman, and the Jazira region with main urban centres in Qamishli and al-Hasakah. In these regions, the population comprises either solely Yazidis or a mixture of Yazidis and Muslim Kurds.
Due to a lack of historical sources, documenting the history of Yazidis in Syria remains challenging to this day. It is, however, assumed that their presence in this region dates back to the early period of Yazidi settlement in Sinjar and Turkish Jazira, i.e., the twelfth century. Today, estimates suggest that Syria is home to around 160,000 Kurds and approximately 5,000 Yazidis, who are officially designated as foreign nationals on their identity documents.[21]
Yazidis in Armenia
The Kurdish presence in the Caucasus dates back to the end of the tenth century when two Kurdish dynasties, the Shaddadids (951–1199) and the Rawwadids (955–1227), ruled across the region. During the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, Kurdish tribes resettled in Armenia, specifically in the south of Karabakh. Today, the majority of the Yazidi population in the Republic of Armenia is concentrated around Mount Aragats. In the nineteenth century, conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Russia arose. Due to Kurdish uprisings against the Ottomans, the Kurdish population — both Muslims and Yazidis — was forced, for their safety, to relocate to Tsarist Russia, which welcomed them as a potentially useful tool in the struggle against the Ottomans.[22]
At the end of the 1930s and after the Second World War, many Armenian Yazidis moved to Georgia and other parts of the Soviet Union. For example, a larger Yazidi community emerged in the city of Novosibirsk. During the 1950s and 1960s, Yazidis continued to migrate to larger Georgian cities, particularly Tbilisi and Telavi, seeking employment and improved living conditions.
The Sinjar Massacre
The massacre began on 3 August 2014, when Islamic State terrorists attacked Yazidi settlements around the Sinjar mountains and neighbouring towns. A few weeks earlier, IS had captured the Iraqi city of Mosul. Kurdish government militias, known as the Peshmerga, had promised to protect the Yazidis but withdrew from their positions even before the terrorist groups reached the Sinjar region. The crimes committed by IS against the Yazidi population included killings, sexual slavery, enslavement, torture, the application of means leading to slow death, and measures intended to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversions of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and the relocation of Yazidi children to IS training camps. These actions aimed to sever them from their faith, their community, and ultimately to erase their ethnic identity.[23]
More than 50,000 Yazidis were trapped on Mount Sinjar, having fled persecution by soldiers who surrounded them on four sides, leaving no means of escape. Hundreds of Yazidis died on the mountain, deprived of food and water, succumbing to exhaustion and extreme heat. During these days, several helicopters delivered water and food; however, as the bottles were dropped from the air, many shattered upon impact, rendering the aid ineffective. Hosni recalled, „he had seen a young boy with water and offered him a thousand dollars for it because his entire family was dying of thirst, but the boy refused, as at that moment no one cared about money but only about survival under such harsh conditions.“ Assistance eventually reached the Yazidis after twelve days, when PKK (Kurdistan Workers‘ Party) units succeeded in opening a single route, allowing the Yazidis to descend from the mountains and flee to Iraqi Kurdistan, where they were accommodated in refugee camps. Almost all villages were evacuated within three days of the attack. The exception was the village of Kocho, which faced assault until 15 August, having been surrounded on all sides and with villagers held hostage in their own homes. Any attempts to escape by car or on foot were met with immediate gunfire. The village of Kocho became a symbol of the Yazidi genocide. Over 3,000 Yazidi men were murdered and buried in mass graves; more than 7,000 women and children were abducted and sold into slavery, half of whom remain missing.[24] Only a few thousand Yazidis were fortunate enough to reach safety in countries like Germany through humanitarian efforts. Today, over 300,000 Yazidis remain in refugee camps in northern Iraq within the Kurdish autonomous region. Many have been unable or unwilling to return to Sinjar because all their property was destroyed and the security situation in the area remains unstable. The number of successfully approved asylum applications in Germany is declining.
Emigration of Yazidis to Europe
Yazidis began to emigrate to Europe—particularly to Germany—as early as the 1960s. The initial arrivals came from Turkey, many of whom settled in Celle, Lower Saxony.[25] To secure employment in Germany as Gastarbeiters, they had to be in good health and literate. Many first‑generation Yazidis had worked in agriculture in Turkey, came from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, and possessed limited education.[26]
Yazidi women were predominantly illiterate, primarily for two reasons: their families, fearing abduction, refrained from sending them to school, and prevailing Middle Eastern norms limited girls’ education in favour of domestic and child-rearing roles. Consequently, the first generation of Yazidis exhibited very low educational attainment until the late 1980s. It was only the second generation that began to take advantage of educational opportunities in Germany. Today, most Yazidi families regard formal education as essential to their children’s integration into German society and access to the German labour market.[27] Members of this generation often run their own businesses and are actively involved in Yazidi organisations.
The second-largest group of Yazidis in Germany originates from Syria. The most significant migration waves within this group occurred between 1980 and 1990[28], followed by further arrivals after 2011, coinciding with the onset of the Syrian civil war.
The largest influx of Yazidis to Germany occurred following the Sinjar atrocities. In 2015 alone, over 75,000 Yazidis escaped from Iraq to Germany, with more than 10,000 from Syria.[29]
Before 2014, roughly 600,000 Yazidis lived in northern Iraq, while the diaspora in Germany numbered approximately 100,000. According to the Central Council of Yazidis, more than 150,000 reside in Germany today, mainly in Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. As part of a rehabilitation programme, Baden-Württemberg accepted approximately 1,000 traumatized women and girls who had fallen victim to IS. In collaboration with Duhok University, the region also established a psychotherapy institute in northern Iraq intended to assist traumatized individuals on site.[30] All of my respondents arrived in Germany after 2015, having lived for varying durations in refugee camps in Kurdistan. Some travelled via Turkey and Greece; others took different routes. For instance, Hussein recounted travelling with his uncle through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Austria to reach Germany. Hosni spent three years in Greece, two of which were as a volunteer at “Lifting Hands International” in a refugee camp, working in a clothes warehouse, assisting children, and interpreting from English into Kurmanji Kurdish. His language skills often facilitated communication between refugees, volunteers, and donors in the camp. Family reunification is a common phenomenon: younger family members or men typically arrive first, followed later by their spouses and elderly parents. Integration is more challenging for older generations, and some consequently remain in Iraq, especially if family ties there persist.
Culture and Traditions
Yazidi culture and traditions are rich and influenced by various Middle Eastern cultures, yet they are uniquely characterised by their connection to nature. April is considered the most significant month of the year, marking nature’s resurgence and symbolising a new beginning in all aspects of life. The principal symbol of Yazidism is the Sun—prominent in Yazidi temples, cultural centres, and on tombstones.
Festivals
Yazidis observe numerous traditional festivals, many of which are little known among younger generations. Most of these celebrations are linked to natural cycles, rooted in ancient Iranian religions, and are celebrated at different times of the year.
The Batzmi and the woven thread basmbari. The celebration of Batzmi is observed by a small subgroup of Yazidis belonging to the Jelka clan. The festival, whose origins stretch back millennia, is also known as Eid Sarsal, Taus Melek, or Eid Pir Ali. Pir Ali revitalised the celebration among the Jelka and instructed his followers to celebrate it annually during the last week of December for seven days. Diaspora communities, due to work or school commitments, may celebrate it one week earlier or later. The rituals vary daily and are performed exclusively by Jelka clan members, though they are attended by Yazidis from other clans and castes. A central ritual involves the creation and exchange of basmbari—a symbolic thread of two intertwined colours—on the sixth day. The thread is woven using a wooden tool called a ta shi, combining a red thread known as ezdani soor and a white one called tausi melek. The white represents light; the red symbolises the dawn’s first glow—considered the most sacred time. The entwined threads are worn as necklaces or bracelets by adults and children and are believed to protect against illness, evil spirits, and the envy of others. Wearers are advised to make a wish in their mind. There is a tradition that those who wear the thread continuously for a year without breaking it will have their wish granted.
Rojeet Ezi. This festival is observed on the first Friday in December, preceded by a three-day fast— the only fast observed in Yazidism. The fast begins at sunrise and ends at sunset, marking a time of prayer and communion with the Divine. Yazidis regard this fast as a practice dating back more than 3,500 years, in honour of the birth of the god-of-light and protector of truth Mithra, as referenced in the Rigveda. The Mithraic tradition has maintained this ritual, passing it through generations (informant: Farhad). Yazidis consider fasting to be a religious and moral obligation before God. Rojeet Ezi, literally the “Festival of the Almighty”, falls in December; in 2020 it occurred on 18 December.
Sere Sal, or New Year. Yazidi New Year is celebrated on the first Wednesday of April and is also called the Feast of the Peacock Angel or Red Wednesday. It is a family-centred celebration involving animal sacrifice, home decoration with spring flowers, egg-dyeing, and the baking of a special bread called sawuk. According to Yazidi belief, God created the world in the shape of an egg within stone, initially covered in ice. God sent the Peacock Angel to break this ice, making the world habitable. The Angel then adorned the Earth with flowers and plants. Thus, Sere Sal symbolises the day when the Peacock Angel brought spring to the earth. During this festival, Yazidis crack coloured eggs and decorate them with red poppies.[31] Egg colours are said to represent the rainbow created by the Angel as he descended into the Lalesh Valley to bless the land with fertility and renewal.
A key element of Sere Sal is the motif of fire, the sun, and the return of deceased ancestors—especially the Peacock Angel himself. Yazidis believe that spirits of the dead return from their graves each year on Red Wednesday to celebrate Sere Sal with the living. Yazidis visit cemeteries to greet their departed relatives, share food, and celebrate together. A large fire is lit in the Lalesh Valley on the eve of Sere Sal, believed to summon the Peacock Angel in the form of the sun. Fire is thus regarded as a sacred earthly embodiment of the fiery Angel. The cooking of eggs symbolises the transformation of the earth from a liquid to solid state. In the diaspora, religious traditions have largely faded, though families still dye eggs, decorate homes, and visit Yazidi graves where present. Celebrations are held in Yazidi cultural centres, often with singing and dancing.
Khidr Aylas. Another festival practised by Yazidis worldwide is the religious celebration of “Khidr Nabi and Khidr Aylas”, honouring saints Khidr and Aylas—patrons of lovers and wish fulfilment. This festival is celebrated on the first Friday in February. Yazidis view Khidr Nabi and Khidr Aylas as two riders on a white horse (Xidir Nebî û Xidir Eylas siyarê hespêd boz). The former is the fulfiller of wishes and patron of lovers, the latter a patron of seafarers.
The festival is preceded by a three-day fast (rojî). Participants rise before dawn and after prayer partake in a simple meal (paşîv). They abstain from food and drink until sundown, and thereafter perform a ritual washing of hands and face, pray, and eat the fitar meal. During these days, dishes prepared from grains, flour, and dairy products abide. Yazidis believe that Khidr Nabi and Khidr Aylas accept no sacrifices. Hunting and travel are prohibited during this time, as the saints are said to be on a spiritual hunt and should not be disturbed.
Cuisine
Yazidi cuisine features a wide array of fruits and vegetables. The most favoured meats are sheep, lamb, and chicken. Yazidi fare closely parallels other Middle Eastern cuisines and bears many similarities to Kurdish dishes. In a host family with whom the author stayed, the question “Do you enjoy Kurdish food?” arose, highlighting the interplay of national identity whereby some foods are termed Yazidi despite being identical to Kurdish fare. Savoury dishes are typically served with rice or bread (naan), similar to a tortilla. A common staple is eprah, stuffed vine leaves filled with bulgur, minced meat, carrot, tomato, pepper, and onion. Eprah is often part of a dish called dolma, served alongside pan-fried potato slices and roast meat. These three components are cooked separately but then combined and served on a large platter.
Another popular dish is biryani, a spiced rice dish with meat and vegetables—Yazidis often add peanuts and raisins. Kotilk comprises filled dumplings, a typical Kurdish speciality, served boiled or fried with various sauces. Marigha Bamia is a Middle Eastern stewed lamb dish with okra and tomatoes.[32]
One of the most beloved desserts is kuliča, a biscuit filled with date paste, jam, or a mixture of walnuts and sugar. Traditionally, kuliča is baked in abundance for religious festivals or celebrations.
Sacred Objects
As in all religions, Yazidism features several sacred objects that occupy an honoured place in every household. These items adorn homes in the diaspora and carry both religious and cultural significance. One such artefact is the barāt or al‑barat.
Al-Barat is a sacred Yazidi symbol traditionally crafted in Lalish on the night of Shiv Barat—the longest night of the year in ancient Mithraic practice. The barāt, resembling a grain and roughly the size of a walnut, symbolises the Earth’s renewal. It is created by šamsāni, young, unmarried girls and boys who serve in the Lalish sanctuary and have voluntarily renounced marriage. The mixture comprises soil from the Cave of Barat near Lalish, water from the holy spring Kania Spi, and a dash of milk. Baba chāwīsh, a spiritual attendant at Lalish, draws the water and combines it with the earth, forming small balls that are sun-dried.[33] The resulting barāt embodies both Earth and the rebirth of nature.
Every Yazidi traveller must carry a barāt for spiritual protection. Each morning before breakfast, the barāt must be kissed—especially during fasts—and it is taboo for a husband to hand it directly to his wife, or vice versa, as it represents a covenant, oath, and brotherhood. Such an act would symbolically render the other as a sibling. This custom was observed by the author during a visit to a Yazidi household: the hostess offered the barāt to all present—with the exception of her husband—explaining that it would create a sibling bond. The barāt thus functions as a symbol of fidelity and loyalty and must not be used falsely in oath-taking. Yazidis use it to seal agreements and make solemn promises.
The barāt is also associated with the ḥalāt, colloquially known in Yazidi homes as a bohček. This small, hand-sewn fabric pouch, often fitted with a circular metal band (symbolising the wholeness of Yazidism), contains sacred objects.
Family Rituals
Marriage. Yazidis traditionally marry young—often around the age of fifteen—in arranged marriages negotiated by parents. Consent from both parties is essential and coercive practices are discouraged. The groom’s family pays a bride-price determined by the bride’s beauty and her family’s standing within the clan. Although this custom has relaxed somewhat, it remains prevalent. In the German diaspora, bride-prices can reach up to €70,000.[34] In Iraq, according to a respondent, the price may begin at approximately €1,000. In cases of familial disapproval, couples may elope to a neighbouring village or relative’s home; by doing so, families are obliged to consent, demonstrating the couple’s determination—a practice reminiscent of certain Muslim communities in the Middle East.
On the eve of the wedding, the bride prepares for her henna night—sheva desthineye—by taking a hot bath and entering a gathering room with guests. Her hands and those of the bridesmaids are adorned in henna. On the wedding day, the bride wears traditional attire and a red sash around her waist, affixed by her sister. The ceremony includes a procession from the bride’s home to the groom’s, accompanied by animal sacrifice—typically a sheep—and the groom is escorted by his brother. Today, Yazidi weddings in urban and diaspora settings often take place in banquet halls. They maintain great significance, evidenced by the popularity of wedding videos on YouTube—Ezidxan TV, for example, features a wedding segment documenting vibrant celebrations with music and dance. Live music remains essential at Yazidi weddings in Germany. Tradition dictates that the bride remain with her parents for seven days post-wedding before moving to her husband’s home.
Yazidis practice strict endogamy, with polygamy tolerated but socially discouraged—especially within the diaspora. Inter-ethnic marriage is forbidden: a Yazidi woman marrying a non-Yazidi is automatically excommunicated and cannot convert her spouse. Marriages across castes are also prohibited.[35]
Funeral. Death, to Yazidis, signifies the separation of soul and the soul’s transmigration into a new body. They believe in reincarnation, paradise, and hell—after the Final Judgment, the soul returns in a new form without recollection of its past deeds, absolving it of guilt.
The deceased is washed with hot water by a birājé āchīraté—a “brother for the afterlife”—typically a Sheikh. Informant Farhad explained that the use of hot water symbolises the precaution that the individual may not be dead; warm water might revive them. After washing, the body is wrapped in a white shroud (kifin), and a piece of barāt is placed in the mouth. The body is then placed in a coffin and carried to the cemetery, where the grave is pre-dug, with the head positioned eastwards toward the sunrise. A small hole is left near the head to allow the departing soul to exit.[36]
The funeral procession is silent except for spiritual leaders chanting hymns at the front. Women weep and beat their chests. On the same day, a memorial feast is held—often at a Yazidi cultural centre in the diaspora, accommodating over a hundred people.
In Germany, Yazidi cemeteries emerged in the late 1990s. Initially, Yazidis were allocated sections within Christian cemeteries; later they established dedicated cemeteries. Many funeral rituals are omitted in the diaspora—for example, widows shaving their heads to hang their hair on the husband’s grave is not permitted in German cemeteries.[37] Yazidi tombstones are adorned with symbols such as the sun, peacock, or the image of the Lalish shrine. Above the name is often inscribed the ethnic identifier Êzîdî, Yezidi, or Yezide, sometimes with caste indication.[38]
Mor Kirin (Baptism). Yazidis have preserved numerous religious and cultural rituals through centuries of persecution. Mor kirin, or baptism, is one of their most important rites. Conducted only with water from the Kanya Spi spring in Lalish, it symbolises a spiritual bond with nature. In Germany, the ritual is performed in Yazidi cultural centres by a high-ranking cleric authorised by the *bāba shēkh*. Mr. Naîf attested that water is imported from the original spring. Some Yazidis believe that without being performed at Kanya Spi itself, the baptism cannot be considered authentic mor kirin.
Circumcision. Yazidi boys are circumcised approximately 20 days after baptism. A kerif—a godparent—is chosen, and a blood-bond is formed between the families that precludes marriage for seven generations. This ensures the kerif is selected purposefully from a non-marriageable group, often another caste or a Muslim—commonly Kurdish—to foster inter-community ties. While the ritual may take place at home, increasingly in diaspora contexts it occurs in hospitals for hygiene and child safety.[39]
Hierarchical Society
Yazidi society is stratified into three castes, each with its own roles and responsibilities. Marriage across castes and with non-Yazidis is forbidden. The highest caste comprises šēkh, akin to an aristocracy; next are pīrs, the spiritual class; and finally mirīds, the lay members, who represent the majority. Šēkh and pīrs constitute only 5 % of the population and are believed to be descendants of sacred mythological figures.[40]
This hierarchical structure persists in Germany, making marital compatibility within the same caste difficult for younger diaspora members. Sufyan remarked: “It will be harder for me to find a bride in Germany than if I lived in Iraq, but the situation is still better than in the 1990s when the Yazidi diaspora was smaller.” Some families arrange marriages in Iraq and then bring the spouse to Europe.
Language
Most Yazidis consider Kurmanji, a dialect of Kurdish, to be their native language. Only a small minority speak Arabic, and some Kurmanji speakers—particularly in Bahzani and Bashiqa—do not identify as Yazidi. In the Caucasus, a dialect known as Jezdiki emerged. The term is often rejected by Yazidi intellectuals who regard themselves as ethnically Kurdish; Jezidiki is adopted by those who reject any identification of Yazidis as Kurds. Debates reveal a conflation between language and glossonym: some argue that Jezidiki is a distinct language from Kurdish, or that it does not exist and is simply Kurdish. Linguistically, the Kurdish language encompasses multiple dialects; Kurmanji and Jezidiki are glossonyms—different names for the same language—often arising from nationalist or phonetic distinctions.
The Kurdish alphabet comprises 23 consonants and 8 vowels, distinguishing between short and long vowel sounds. Approximately 80 % of all Kurds speak the Kurmanji dialect. In contemporary usage, the Latin script is employed for Kurdish in Turkey and Syria, the Arabic script is used in Iran and Iraq, while in the former Soviet Union, the Cyrillic alphabet is adopted.[41]
Religion
Yazidis claim to practice the oldest religion in the world, citing the structure of their calendar as evidence. Their religious calendar spans over 6,764 years, making the year 2020 CE correspond to the Yazidi year 6,776. Compared with other major faiths, it is 4,750 years older than the Christian (Gregorian) calendar, 990 years older than the Jewish calendar, and 5,329 years older than the Islamic calendar. Yazidis worship a supernatural deity known as Xwede, the creator of the universe. Before creating humankind, God fashioned seven angels as His manifestations. Upon creation of the world, these angels descended to Earth to pay homage to Adam as God’s finest creation. While all the angels complied, Taus Melek refused, stating that he would bow only before God, not a human. God rewarded his loyalty by entrusting him with stewardship over the world. This narrative also explains why uttering “šayṭān” (Satan) aloud is considered a grave insult—because Adam, offended, called Taus Melek “Satan”.[42]
Despite its oral tradition, Yazidism possesses two sacred texts: Kitêba Cilwe (the Book of Revelation) and Mišefa Reš (the Black Book). These manuscripts were first published in 1911 and 1913, but were later revealed to be forgeries authored by Western travellers with an interest in Yazidism. Nonetheless, the content is thought to reflect authentic Yazidi hymns. The community is currently engaged in collecting and compiling these hymns, potentially transforming Yazidism into a scripture-based tradition. The Black Book narrates the creation of the world, describing how God fashioned a white pearl from which Taus Melek emerged, and recounts the creation of Adam and Eve, concluding with a discussion of Yazidi taboos.[43] The Book of Revelation is written in the first person, as if God is speaking directly to humanity, whereas the Black Book is authored in the third person. The Book of Revelation contains five chapters, which recount God’s deeds and power. It asserts that God does not require a holy book to convey His words and warns against cultural assimilation, urging Yazidis to maintain allegiance to their faith and avoid integration into other religious traditions.[44]
Relation to Politics
Selection of the Yazidi Prince (mîr). For all Yazidis worldwide, the only secular authority is a prince known as the mîr, whose seat is always in Iraq. According to tradition, the successor must be chosen from the same family. The family of the previous mîr nominates one to three candidates, and the Spiritual Council along with leading Yazidi clans select the new mîr.
The mîr presides over the Foundation for Yazidi Affairs and is a member of the Yazidi Spiritual Council. This foundation, including the Babā Shêkh and the Sheikh’s minister, issues all community decisions. Recently, the selection of a new mîr became politically influenced by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The Yazidis of Sinjar and others outside Iraqi Kurdistan desired a different candidate, but the designated mîr belongs to the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the dominant regional political force. Consequently, two rival mîrs now claim authority: the officially recognised one residing in Sheikhan and a locally accepted alternative among Sinjar Yazidis. (Informant: Farhad)
This duality raises significant questions about diaspora and Caucasus Yazidis: their ethnic identity is jeopardised when their spiritual leader aligns politically with Kurdish regional power, particularly given the distrust of Kurdish governance following Sinjar’s tragedy. As one respondent, Hosni, noted: “There has always been a tendency by the Iraqi government to Arabise Yazidis or compel them to convert to Islam. The Kurds allow Yazidis religious freedom, but insist the Yazidis are Kurds, which many Yazidis do not accept.” This highlights the pressure to assimilate into Kurdish identity. Notably, a distinct Yazidi nationalism emerged in Georgia and Armenia, where Yazidis actively oppose policies threatening their distinct identity.
Selection of the Spiritual Leader (Babā Shêkh). The Spiritual Council, after consultation with the mîr and religious dignitaries, appoints the Babā Shêkh who oversees religious affairs. The new Babā Shêkh is selected 40 days after the predecessor’s death. Khartu Hajj Ismail served in this role until he passed away on 1 October at age 87 in an Erbil hospital, following a decline in health.
Prospective candidates must satisfy strict criteria: they must hail from the Babā Shêkh lineage—though not necessarily a direct descendant—and be well-versed in Yazidi teachings. The family claims descent from Sheikh Fakhri Adia, a revered Yazidi scholar, philosopher, and spiritual leader. (Informant: Farhad)
Adaptation of Yazidis in a New Environment
In Germany, Yazidis are primarily concentrated in the federal states of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, centred in Celle, Hanover, and Bielefeld.
Their adaptation in Germany has been relatively swift, especially among younger Yazidis who are more flexible and receptive to change. Older generations face a more protracted and complex integration process, often due to limited participation in integration programmes. For example, Mr Khalil explained:
“Because I do not speak German well, it is difficult to find work. When I need help with administrative matters, my nine‑year‑old daughter helps, as she attends school and speaks German fluently.”
Another factor affecting employment is Germany’s social welfare system: for large families, it can be more financially advantageous to receive benefits rather than seek low-paying employment. Many women, often without even basic education and caring for multiple children, are unable to work. Their husbands typically accept unskilled jobs with wages around €1,500. Informal testimony For asylum seekers, monthly state support is approximately €340–350 per person.[45] Should a spouse begin working, benefits are reduced or withdrawn entirely, making continued reliance on welfare more economically rational for large families.
Over the past decade, the Yazidi community has undergone transformative change. Diaspora life grants Yazidis the freedom to practise their religion without fear of persecution. They no longer conceal their faith or deny their ethnic identity in Germany. This newfound liberty enables them to present themselves proudly as one of the world’s oldest ethno-religious groups, contributing cultural richness. Yet, collective trauma from long-standing persecution—and particularly the Sinjar genocide—continues to shape their identity and collective discourse through art, literature, philosophy, and religious studies.
The establishment of Yazidi cultural centres has become central to this shift, producing journals on Yazidism and hosting discussions on current issues. Gradually, the oral tradition is being supplemented by written records to preserve cultural heritage. This “new Yazidism” no longer centres exclusively on Lalish, although it remains deeply meaningful as the symbolic homeland for Yazidis worldwide.[46]
Although the Yazidis in the diaspora can preserve their culture and religion, several challenges arise. One such issue—common across many contemporary societies—is intergenerational conflict: younger generations are beginning to distance themselves, ideologically, from their elders. As with other migrant groups, a clash occurs between older individuals, for whom life in the diaspora remains difficult, and younger members, who view the host country as home. Migration’s context—urbanisation and access to education—exerts new restrictions on younger Yazidis, requiring them to reframe theological concepts. For example, critical thinking learned in European schools makes it difficult for some young people to accept traditional taboos or understand hymns (qewly), as they find no rational explanation. Another emerging problem is the reluctance of young Yazidis to accept marriage partners chosen by their parents. The elders’ preference for arranged marriages and the high bride-price create an economic chasm that may threaten the unity of the Yazidi community in Germany. Family conflicts have arisen, with some young people leaving home, endogamy rules being relaxed, and women becoming increasingly emancipated.
On the other hand, Yazidis can—for the first time in their history—celebrate festivals and weddings freely. They have the opportunity to share their traditions with the German majority through cultural invitations and public events.[47]
Yazidi Organisations in Germany and Worldwide
Since the early 1990s, Germany has become the centre of the Yazidi diaspora. Immigration to Germany has significantly shaped their religious and cultural life.[48] Yazidism is inherently tied to its place of origin, which necessitated adapting many traditions to suit the opportunities available in the host country. Yazidi society could no longer remain in isolation—it had to open up to the world while finding ways to preserve and transmit its identity to the next generation. The establishment of cultural associations, publication of journals, and creation of lay associations marked the first signs of social transformation within the diaspora. The Yazidi diaspora now faces new challenges: preserving ethnic identity, practising their religion, and maintaining customs and traditions. To retain their identity in Western contexts, Yazidis must adapt religious practice and tradition, balancing old customs with modern diasporic life. A key shift has been the move from oral to written transmission of religious texts, and a gradual embrace of individualism alongside collective practices. These factors led to the emergence of the first Yazidi organisations in the diaspora. Their mission is to support Yazidis in adapting to their new environment, assisting with administrative affairs, and providing venues for cultural events and celebrations. Cultural centres serve younger Yazidis by offering spaces for cultural self-expression. These organisations also focus on strengthening youth identity, often through teaching Yazidism’s religion and history.[49] Most are funded through donations and sponsorships; regionally, they can apply for grants to support specific projects. Below are some notable examples.
One of the earliest and most active organisations is the Yazidi Forum, founded in 1993.[50] Established by several Yazidi families from Oldenburg, its initial aim was to preserve and transmit religious and cultural values to younger generations. Since its inception, its services have expanded to include administrative support for new Yazidi immigrants and psychological and social assistance. Integration support for youth navigating bicultural identities is pivotal, as is supporting Yazidi women in integrating into German society through education and participation in forum activities.[51]
Another institution is the Yazidi Academy (Ezidische Akademie), based in Hanover. Focused on the current situation of Yazidi minorities, its primary objectives include promoting community cohesion, reducing barriers between Yazidis and the German majority, public relations, and publishing the journal Zeitschrift der Ezidische Akademie on Yazidi religion and culture. The Academy also supports families and their children in navigating the German educational system.[52] Worth mentioning is the Gesellschaft Ezidischer AkademikerInnen (GEA)—the world’s largest Yazidi academic organisation. GEA fosters transnational and interdisciplinary academic cooperation, intercultural understanding, human rights advocacy, youth and women’s empowerment, and the promotion of Yazidi culture and faith.[53]
The Central Council of Yazidis in Germany, based in Bielefeld, represents Yazidi interests nationwide and serves as the umbrella organisation for 29 regional Yazidi associations. Founded on 29 January 2017, its objectives include safeguarding Yazidism, achieving minority recognition under international law, incorporating Yazidism into school curricula, and advocating politically for recognition of the Yazidi genocide. It also provides aid to Yazidi refugees and supports reconstruction efforts in Sinjar, Lalish, and other culturally significant sites in northern Iraq.[54]
Beyond Germany, Yazidi organisations operate in other countries, with some working on an international level. For example, the National Union of Yazidis of Armenia, founded in 1989, aims to unite Yazidis and promote Yazidi national culture globally. In recent years, it has supported Yazidis from Iraq who suffered persecution, assisting them with social integration and cultural development, and facilitating the establishment of Yazidi schools and the introduction of Kurmanji language instruction.[55]
The Free Yezidi Foundation is a politically independent non-profit organisation established in 2015, shortly after the August 2014 genocidal attack in Iraq. It delivers humanitarian services to genocide survivors—especially women and children—with a specific focus on trauma recovery and psychological support. The Foundation implements projects to protect and assist vulnerable community members.[56]
One of the most well-known Yazidi aid organisations is Yazda, a multinational Yazidi group formed in response to the 2014 genocide. Founded in Nebraska, USA, its initial mission was humanitarian assistance during the IS siege of Sinjar in 2014, providing food and water to approximately 60,000 Yazidis trapped for ten days. Yazda also prioritised rescuing Yazidi women and girls, over 3,200 of whom were sold into sexual slavery; many remain in captivity.[57] Yazda’s ongoing mission encompasses psychological aid, healthcare for survivors, humanitarian distribution in refugee camps, raising human rights awareness, documenting IS crimes, advocating for genocide recognition, supporting Yazidi activists, collecting evidence for international legal proceedings, and organising burials—such as that of 104 genocide victims in Kojo on 6 February 2021.
Relations between Yazidis and the German Majority
When asked about their relationships with the German majority, all respondents replied positively. They reportedly get on well with Germans, and none have experienced nationalist hostility. Younger respondents even claimed to have German friends. Although no direct conflicts were reported, a subtle divide exists: Yazidi families tend to socialise primarily with other Yazidis or migrants from the Middle East—particularly from the former Soviet Union—due to shared experiences or historical backgrounds. Few older Yazidis would invite Germans to their homes, not out of animosity but rather owing to deep cultural differences and limited language proficiency among the elders. The social landscape in Germany is often described in terms of “us” (Germans at home, welcoming migrants) and “them” (migrants slowly integrating yet retaining cultural and religious customs).
Germany maintains a favourable migration policy and is a key destination for third-country immigrants. Since 2014, nearly two million refugees—including thousands of Yazidis from Iraq and Syria—have been granted asylum. The German government supports the Yazidi community both domestically and in Iraq. With the largest Yazidi diaspora base, Germany hosts the greatest number of Yazidi NGOs. Despite more than 400 measures under the National Integration Plan—including integration courses, language tuition, legal education, vocational training for migrant professionals, and social and healthcare services—some Yazidis fear that their asylum status may not be renewed. As respondent Hosni expressed:
“Germany can decide at any time that we are no longer at risk and therefore have no reason to extend our asylum. I personally know a young family with children who were returned to Iraq after six years, despite being law‑abiding; I do not understand why.”
Although the security situation in northern Iraq has improved, Yazidis maintain that it is never truly safe: sporadic attacks and abductions continue, thousands remain missing, and political instability endures—exemplified by the unprecedented dispute between the two mîrs. Moreover, competing claims over Sinjar by the Iraqi and Kurdish authorities exacerbate the risk—Yazidis may receive no protection from either side during conflict.
Instances of deportation have been rare and often justified by authorities. Recently, reports have emerged of Yazidi families voluntarily returning to Iraqi refugee camps, citing difficulties in integrating into German society. A few girls—survivors of sexual slavery—have returned to Iraq after encountering IS-affiliated perpetrators in Germany posing as refugees. Unfortunately, among the hundreds of thousands who fled war, some IS radicals also entered Europe under refugee status, illustrating the challenge of ensuring such individuals do not cross EU borders.
Conclusion
The Yazidis have historically lived as an insular ethnic‑religious group, frequently oppressed by majority societies due to their religious differences. Until the mid‑20th century, their migration typically remained within the Middle East—e.g., from Turkey to Syria, or Iraq to Syria or Armenia. Only in the 1990s did Yazidi migration to Europe begin, with Germany as the principal destination. Mass migration to Germany occurred primarily in 2014, following the genocide perpetrated by IS. Since then, numerous Yazidi cultural centres have been established in the regions where Yazidi minorities settled—benefiting from existing organisations such as the Yazidi Forum (established in 1993).[58] These associations endeavour to provide cultural and religious activities and assist in other domains to support integration into the majority society. Typically founded by long‑settled Yazidis—sometimes in collaboration with NGOs—they are frequently funded by wealthier diaspora members in Germany or abroad (e.g., from Armenia), or by local grants.
Germany has become a migrant magnet due to several factors: its rapid post‑war economic recovery; a high standard of living; robust social security; and generally favourable attitudes toward migrants. Its National Integration Plan—with more than 400 proposed measures—aims to promote opportunities for immigrants and support their integration via measures such as language and orientation courses, early childhood programmes, employment support for migrant professionals (such as teachers and doctors), health and social services, and efforts to reduce intercultural barriers.[59]
The Yazidis maintain a diverse range of traditions and festivals, which they endeavour to observe even in diaspora. Most celebrations centre on hospitality, mutual visitation, and shared meal preparation. Since Yazidi women traditionally oversee the household and child-rearing, they also manage the logistical aspects of these festivals. In the diaspora, however, the spiritual dimension of these observances often shifts. Several festivals traditionally require ritual activities performed by Yazidi clergy—who are largely absent in Germany—and so these rituals are frequently omitted. For instance, festivals may proceed without the singing of hymns (qewaly), due to the scarcity of qewals in Germany, or the scale of celebrations may be reduced because apartments cannot accommodate the large gatherings typical of Iraqi villages.
Despite the availability of various integration programmes for newly arrived migrants, many Yazidis find employment difficult to secure. A significant number remain illiterate, eschewing even language classes, and consequently face language barriers that deter employers. Additionally, many migrants lack qualifications: several have only completed primary education and have no vocational training. A notable divide exists between Yazidis from Iraq or Syria and those from the Caucasus region; the latter generally possess higher levels of education—often secondary or tertiary—and their proficiency in Russian facilitates integration, as many German enterprises are owned by Russians or German-Kazakhs. These employers tend to hire workers from the East, offering Russian-speaking individuals a pathway into the workforce and, eventually, into supervisory roles. Conversely, Yazidis from the Middle East more readily find work in gastronomic enterprises—such as kebab restaurants or food kiosks—typically owned by Turks or Kurds, where language barriers are less prohibitive. In regions with concentrated Yazidi populations—such as Hanover, Bielefeld, and Oldenburg—long‑settled Yazidis, particularly those arriving in the 1990s, now own gastronomic businesses.
In addition to German government integration initiatives, Yazidi lay associations assist newcomers with adaptation: they help with bureaucratic processes, facilitate employment opportunities, and promote cultural activities. These associations are founded by Yazidis who have been fully integrated into German society but remain committed to preserving their ethnic identity. Yazidi organisations are funded through donations from affluent diaspora members; for larger-scale projects—such as supporting genocide survivors—foundations are established, while regional grants and subsidies are sought for specific initiatives. Some individuals are particularly active: for example, in Oerlinghausen, where a small refugee centre exists, respondent Hosni and his family regularly visit to check for new arrivals and offer financial or material support—clothing for children, food supplies, and so on. Yazidis, aware of their status as a small ethnic minority, display strong solidarity and mutual assistance.
Yazidi identity is underpinned by two interrelated core attributes; the loss of either significantly undermines an individual’s ethnic identity and standing within the community. The first attribute is ethnic purity, maintained through endogamous marriage. Marriage outside the Yazidi community is religiously forbidden, and marriage must also occur within the same caste. Nowadays, a Yazidi marrying a person of another faith is more probable than one marrying across caste lines among Yazidis. Strict observance of intracaste marriage remains prevalent even in diaspora settings; violation of this rule results in exclusion from Yazidi society. A Yazidi who marries someone of another faith automatically converts to their partner’s religion, not vice versa. The second attribute is the impossibility of conversion to Yazidism—one can only become Yazidi by birth; the faith is non‑missionary, and there has been no attempt to proselytise non‑Yazidis.
Yazidism incorporates elements from various religions, which has made it a distinct and often misunderstood faith, facing criticism and even extinction in some quarters. Although Yazidis and Kurds share origins, language, dance, cuisine, and attire, it is precisely religion and endogamy that distinguish them. Additionally, Yazidi symbols—such as the Sun and the figure of the Peacock Angel—set Yazidis apart from all other ethno‑religious communities. Together, these attributes form the Yazidi identity, representing one of the world’s most ancient ethno‑religious groups.
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