Author: Rabah Halabi
Affiliation: Oranim Academic College of Education, Tel-Hai College, and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Email: rabah.halabi@gmail.com
Language: English
Issue: 2/2024 (23)
Pages: 66-89 (22 pages)
Keywords: Druze community, military service, Israeli society, identity politics, citizenship, reciprocity, discrimination
Abstract
This article explores the complex and often contradictory experiences of the Druze community in Israel, specifically examining how military service has shaped their identity and integration into Israeli society. While military service is typically viewed as a means of achieving social equality and inclusion, the Druze continue to face discrimination despite fulfilling their national obligations. Using semi-structured interviews, this study investigates the implications of the Druze’s compulsory conscription, focusing on concepts of reciprocity, convertibility, and identity politics. Findings reveal that while military service reinforces the Israeli identity among Druze youth, it fails to provide the expected access to equal rights and full citizenship, thus perpetuating their marginalized status within an ethno-republican state.
Dr. Rabah Halabi
Dr. Rabah Halabi is a distinguished scholar in the fields of education, conflict resolution, and ethnic and national identity, with a particular focus on Arab-Jewish encounters. He earned his Ph.D. in Education from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2004, following a Master’s degree in Philosophy of Education and a BA in Educational Counseling. Dr. Halabi has held several academic positions, including lectureships at the Hebrew University, Oranim College, and Tel-Hai College, and he served as the Director of the School for Peace at Neve Shalom/Wahat al Salam. His work often centers on themes of dialogue, education, and minority rights, contributing significantly to the understanding of conflict resolution in multicultural societies. He has authored several publications on these topics, and his active participation in international conferences reflects his commitment to advancing scholarly dialogue on Arab-Jewish relations and peace education.
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Introduction
Military service is often seen as a means to facilitate the integration of minority groups into the social and political fabric of a country, thereby contributing to equality among all citizens[1]. Nevertheless, despite their military service and fulfilment of all obligations as citizens, the Druze minority in Israel continues to face discrimination. This inequality is, in part, rooted in the dual and somewhat contradictory definition of the State as both democratic and Jewish. From a critical standpoint, this definition characterises Israeli society as ethnicised[2] or predominantly ethno-republican[3]. For the majority of Israelis, citizenship is perceived primarily through an ethnic lens, with individuals identifying themselves as Arabs or Jews before expressing a shared Israeli identity[4].
I argue that the alliance of the Druze minority in Israel with the state, primarily articulated through their military service, has failed to fulfil their expectations of achieving full inclusion as citizens. The Druze continue to experience considerable discrimination concerning land, planning, and construction, particularly following the enactment of the Kaminetz Law[5], which has rendered it exceedingly challenging for the Druze to build on lands inherited from their great-grandmothers. This predicament has been further intensified by the passage of the Nation-State Law, which, by defining the country as a Jewish state, has effectively distanced the Druze—alongside the wider Arab community—from their sense of ‚Israeliness‘.
Military service
Military service has historically played a crucial role in transmitting social values and contributing to the formation of a national identity[6]. The military, often conceptualised as a ‚total institution,‘ serves as both a place of work and residence, where individuals in similar positions, isolated from the broader community for extended periods, lead a structured and regulated existence. In this context, military life is believed to foster a strong sense of cohesion and diminish prejudice among its members. Furthermore, the military has been referred to as the “great equaliser,” as it is perceived to provide individuals from lower-income backgrounds with a route towards upward mobility through education and social recognition[7].
Family income or socio-economic status is the most significant determinant of military enrolment[8]. Research indicates that participation in the military can serve as a positive turning point for individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds[9]. The working and middle classes are disproportionately represented in the military, as service provides little incentive for the upper classes to enlist[10].
Scholars assert that the military has been notably effective in reducing racial inequalities, largely due to its emphasis on racially integrated work and living environments, its top-down enforcement of equal opportunity employment policies, and its social hierarchy, which is explicitly based on rank rather than class or race[11].
Empirical findings partially corroborate these views. Wertch[12] highlighted that African-Americans reported experiencing a greater sense of security in their military lives compared to their encounters with racism in civilian life. Furthermore, racial disparities commonly observed in civilian settings do not apply within the military. For example, marriage rates among non-Caucasian minorities in the military are comparable to those of Whites, and divorce rates among these minorities in the military are significantly lower than those of their civilian counterparts[13].
In general, veterans have been shown to enhance their human capital through training and the acquisition of skills that are directly transferable to the civilian sector. Military service can also facilitate educational attainment, thereby improving employment prospects and income potential. Kleykamp[14] suggests that employers tend to favour African-American military veterans with transferable skills over African-Americans who have not undergone military service[15].
Moreover, the military has been instrumental in fostering intercultural contact[16]. Equally significant is the role of the military as a legitimising instrument for groups traditionally excluded from full citizenship[17]. Ben-Shalom[18]work elaborates on the intricate role of the military in the historical development of Western nation-states, emphasising that mass conscription in these regions was regarded as consistent with the duties and rights of citizens. Since World War I, military service has provided marginalised segments of society with a pathway to legitimacy and the attainment of rights[19].
Although still a matter of debate, women’s participation in the military is regarded as a milestone in terms of democratic participation and responsibility, and it is also perceived as an indicator of gender equality[20]. The involvement of Latinos in the military has proven beneficial in addressing what[21] termed the challenge of demonstrating patriotism. Since the Emancipation Proclamation in the USA in 1863, African-Americans have found justification for reclaiming full citizenship rights through their participation in the armed forces[22]. Indeed, research has identified military service as often serving as a positive turning point in the career trajectories of enlistees from disadvantaged backgrounds[23].
Military participation was anticipated to facilitate national integration[24]. Traditionally, historians have portrayed the expectations of the majority towards the integration of minority groups as oppressive and assimilationist. However, research has revealed that minorities actively engage in reshaping their group identities and solidarities, while the dominant group acknowledges that addressing the cultural needs of minority groups is essential to integrating them and ensuring the creation of an effective fighting force with high morale[25].
For non-hegemonic groups, the relationship between the military and citizenship is fraught with conflicts and inherent contradictions. With respect to minorities, Fligstein[26] discovered that, in the early 1970s, African-Americans were less inclined to join the military than their White counterparts. Conversely, Kane[27] found that African-Americans are overrepresented in the military, while Quster[28] notes that Latinos are somewhat underrepresented. Batalova[29] suggests that many immigrants, who currently make up 5% of the armed forces in the USA, are motivated by the prospect that military service may expedite their path to citizenship. In the Dandeker[30] reports that, although ethnic minority representation in the British army is increasing, it remains underrepresented; similarly, Khalidi[31] observes that the Indian army does not reflect the social diversity of the Indian population. It has been proposed that fluctuations in ethnic minority enlistment can be attributed to the perception among these groups that they are likely to face less racial discrimination and find greater employment opportunities in the military than in civilian life, although the propensity to enlist can vary during times of conflict.[32]
Although Israeli Arabs, like all Israeli citizens, are legally required to serve in the military for three years, in 1954, the Minister of Defence issued an order exempting them from service[33]. A notable exception to this policy was the 1956 decision to impose compulsory military service on the Druze. This decision represented a significant turning point for the Druze community, impacting both their identity and their relationship with the state’s institutions.
Given the unique nature of the Druze community, this paper examines how military service in Israel influences the Druze and the extent to which it enables them to achieve the full inclusion into state citizenship that universal conscription was ostensibly designed to provide. Our inquiry centres on the concepts of reciprocity, convertibility, and identity politics.
Reciprocity, convertibility, and identity politics
Modern citizenship emerged as part of the new political order established during the American Revolution, which introduced a reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens—a concept imbued with a profoundly equalising significance[34]. Citizenship entails the capacity, entitlement, and obligation to participate as a full and equal member within both the economy and the polity[35]; participation in the economy involves aspects such as taxation, while in the polity, it involves military service. This relationship represents a form of transaction—an exchange between the right to vote and the obligation of compulsory military service[36]. For marginalised groups excluded from full citizenship, entering this contractual, reciprocal relationship has traditionally been a means to gain inclusion, with bearing arms perceived as a relatively secure pathway to asserting one’s right to be included. Militaries, in turn, invest efforts in instilling civic consciousness among those who have been marginalised by the state[37]. These arrangements rest upon the republican order that established a reciprocal relationship, wherein the state is prepared to grant civil, social, and political rights to citizens willing to bear the burden of war. However, this contractual relationship, with its promise of equality, often appears more aspirational than realised.
While minorities have frequently encountered discrimination within the military, they are sometimes encouraged to enlist through inclusive policies. Kerbs[38] contends that existing hypotheses explaining the adoption of liberal manpower policies in the military—such as major security threats, military professionalism, and increasing societal tolerance—do contribute to our understanding of these processes but lack sufficient explanatory depth. He argues that these theories should be augmented by a perspective that recognises the centrality of political processes and the identity politics inherent within them. Thus, he views enduring changes in military participation policies as the outcome of struggles over national and communal identities.
Yagil Levy[39] introduces the concept of „materialist militarism“ to describe the exchange whereby social groups acquire power through military service, which can then be converted into valuable social positions within the civilian sphere. This exchange is defined by the term convertibility. Levy[40] posits that convertibility is influenced by factors such as the participation ratio, the level of threat, republicanism, the convergence between military and civilian organisations, and identity-building elements. These factors, he suggests, are mutually reinforcing and signify the degree of militarisation or demilitarisation of the state. The ‚exchange rate,‘ or the scale of rewards that a soldier-citizen receives for their sacrifice, is never static. It fluctuates in response to society’s perception of military service as a pathway to legitimisation and power in the civic arena[41].
When selective recruitment policies lead to a manpower shortage, more inclusive policies are generally implemented, providing diverse minority or marginalised groups (such as religious and Sephardic groups in the Israeli context) with an arena in which they can advance their rights[42]. Yet, paradoxically, as these processes unfold, convertibility tends to decline, as the cultural identity offered by the military becomes diluted with the integration of marginalised minority groups.
I find the concepts of reciprocity, convertibility, and identity politics to be particularly valuable frameworks for interpreting our findings.
The Druze in Israel
Approximately 150,000 Druze currently reside in Israel[43]. The Druze community represents just one of many groups within the country’s diverse ethnic mosaic. They can be seen as a minority within a minority: a religious and ethnic subgroup within the broader Arab minority[44]. As a state founded on the principles of Jewish ethnic democracy, Israel has historically struggled to regard its Arab population as equal citizens. The State systematically excludes Arabs, subjecting them to discrimination on both an individual and collective level. The most prevalent practices of exclusion, which persist to this day, involve restricting Arabs’ access to political power, withholding the full benefits of citizenship, and limiting access to social and economic welfare[45].
The question of the ethnic origins of the Druze people remains a topic of ongoing debate. All Druze leaders, historians, and intellectuals in Lebanon and Syria—as well as the broader Druze population—identify themselves as Arabs. In Israel, most Druze similarly align with the national identification of their counterparts in Syria and Lebanon. However, there exists a segment within the Israeli Druze community that contests the idea that their ethnic (Arab) origin should also define their national identity, arguing that being Druze is not solely a religious affiliation but also a national category[46]. Within this spectrum, a small number of Druze identify themselves as Zionist, while at the other extreme, there is a parallel group who consider themselves Palestinian, reflecting the considerable diversity within the Druze community in Israel[47].
To understand the development of Druze identity and their distinct political affiliations, as opposed to their counterparts in Syria and Lebanon, it is essential to consider the historical context in which this identity evolved. At the onset of the Zionist movement, approximately 7,000 Druze lived in Palestine, constituting less than one percent of the total population. As a tiny minority amidst a Muslim majority, the Druze occasionally faced religious harassment, which, coupled with the absence of an intellectual leadership, led them to adopt a neutral stance toward the surrounding conflict. This neutrality heightened existing tensions between the Druze and other Palestinians[48].
Firro[49] suggests that the Zionist movement exploited this rift between the Druze and other Arabs in Palestine, employing various strategies to encourage the Druze to maintain their neutrality or even align with the Zionist cause. Despite these overtures, the Druze largely maintained their neutrality, even during the 1948 War. However, certain incidents, along with the increasing strength of the Jewish military, paved the way for agreements between the Druze and the Jews, leading to a shift from neutrality to supporting the Jewish side, on the condition that Druze villages would remain unharmed[50].
Following the establishment of the State of Israel, the Israeli government continued its policy of separating the Druze from other Arabs as a means of fragmenting, weakening, and exerting control over the Arab-Palestinian minority. In 1956, despite resistance from much of the Druze leadership, especially religious authorities, the law mandating compulsory conscription into the Israel Defense Forces was extended to include Druze youth[51] . From a socio-political perspective, this policy marked a significant turning point in shaping the identity of the Druze community in Israel.
In 1976, the educational system in Druze villages was separated from the broader Arab school system. This Druze education system, staffed mainly by Druze teachers, actively promotes identification with the State and its symbols, emphasising commonalities between the Druze and Jews while simultaneously highlighting distinctions between the Druze and other Arabs[52]. As a result, Druze identity in Israel has evolved to become distinct from that of other Druze worldwide, as well as from that of other Palestinian Arabs in Israel[53]. This unique identity comprises three primary components: a central and stable Druze component, alongside an Arab component and an Israeli component[54].
Military service tends to weaken the Arab aspect of Druze identity while reinforcing the Israeli component. A recent survey examining the attitudes and identity of Arabs in Israel found that 71 percent of Druze identify themselves as Israeli, compared to only 33 percent of Muslims and Christians[55].
It is worth noting that, while the State mandated compulsory military conscription for the Druze, there had already been a segment of Druze who had established connections with Jewish settlers and worked for them as early as the 1930s. Some Druze even fought alongside Jews in the Haganah during the 1948 War. This pro-Zionist stance gained momentum after the establishment of the State and influenced the enactment of the 1956 law enforcing compulsory conscription[56].
Furthermore, despite opposition to compulsory conscription, the vast majority of Druze have remained loyal to the State and its institutions since its establishment, a loyalty that has characterised Druze leadership, particularly their religious leaders. However, starting in the 1980s, after years of witnessing that military service did not lead to their integration as equal citizens, the Druze leadership, led by religious figures, began to protest against State policies[57].
The Druze in the Israeli Defense Forces
Druze men have been serving in the Israeli army since 1956, in contrast to the exemption granted to Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel. Although Bedouin Arabs are exempt from military service, they are encouraged to volunteer, and a number of other Arab Palestinian volunteers serve as well[58].
Most Druze soldiers initially served in the 299th Battalion, which was established primarily to guard Israel’s border with Lebanon. By 1986, this unit was renamed the „Gdud Herev“ (Sword Battalion). Although this special Druze unit continued within the IDF until 2015, by 1983 Druze soldiers were present across all branches of the military. The integration of Druze soldiers into all IDF units meant that they served alongside other Israeli soldiers. Today, most Druze soldiers take on combat roles, including in elite commando units. As of 2012, there were four Druze Brigade commanders (Colonels), two Druze Brigadier Generals, 61 senior Druze officers, and three Druze pilots in the IDF[59].
Due to a combination of factors, including institutionalised discrimination against non-Jews in the economy and generally lower educational attainment within the Druze community, the security services represent a more significant source of permanent employment for Druze than for Jews. In fact, 38.9 per cent of young Druze men express a desire to remain in the army after completing their compulsory service, compared to only 7.4 per cent of their Jewish counterparts[60].
These figures have remained relatively stable over the years. Even if the percentages decrease slightly—mainly due to the rising number of Druze women entering the job market—this trend is expected to persist. Research conducted in 2007 indicated that approximately 30 percent of Druze male wage earners were employed in various security services, compared to just seven percent of Jewish men[61].
Furthermore, careers in the security services represent one area of the labour market where Druze do not have to compete with Arabs for employment, as the latter are excluded from military service[62].
Research method
This article is derived from a larger study on the construction of ethnic identity among the Druze minority in Israel, for which we employed a traditional interpretive qualitative research methodology. This approach was well-suited to our aims, as it seeks to understand people’s experiences and actions from their own perspectives[63]. In gathering the data, we chose semi-structured interviews as proposed by[64]. We chose Bogdan[65]open inductive coding approach to categorize the data that we gathered. The research included interviews with fifty students, half of them men and half of them women, ages 20 to 30, from four large universities and three colleges in different areas of Israel.
I used snowball sampling[66] , for finding the participants. The first interviewee was an acquaintance of the research team and was asked to suggest other students who might be interested in participating in the study. A similar procedure was followed with subsequent interviewees. Participation in the research was entirely voluntary, and participants signed an informed consent form after receiving both a written and verbal explanation (in Arabic) of the research’s purpose, procedures, and expected benefits. They were also assured that their identities would remain confidential and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. The interviews, conducted in Arabic between 2011 and 2012, lasted between sixty and ninety minutes each, and took place at locations chosen by the participants.
The interviews were semi-structured, consisting of two main parts: the first, more open, focused on the interviewee’s personal story, while the second addressed specific topics relevant to the study. The interviews were transcribed as accurately as possible and anonymised in accordance with research ethics.
We read the transcripts several times, discussed the material and, using the open inductive coding method[67], we identified main themes.
For this article, we focused on the parts of the interviews that directly and indirectly addressed participants’ experiences and perspectives on military service. Although, as previously noted, only men are conscripted (with women exempt for religious reasons), we found it valuable to include female interviewees, as their insights broadened our understanding of the wider social issues related to army recruitment within the Druze community. As a case study derived from a larger research project, this investigation does not aim to generalise its findings but rather to illuminate the complexities faced by minority groups in conflict-ridden societies who seek inclusion and are willing to pay a price for that inclusion in mainstream society. While some may consider this a limitation, it is important to note that case studies should be evaluated not on the basis of generalisability but on their transferability and comparability[68]. We begin by presenting excerpts from the interviews, followed by an analysis grounded in the theoretical framework we identified as relevant.
Findings
Forty-seven participants viewed their military service as one of the most significant aspects of their lives as Druze in Israel. The interviewees engaged in intense discussions about the consequences of the State’s decision to impose compulsory military service on the Druze in 1956. They also explored in detail how this decision has influenced the construction of their identity, as well as their relationships with other Arabs, Jews, and the Jewish State.
Mandatory military service in the IDF
Thirty-two interviewees felt compelled to revisit and discuss the very concept of recruiting Druze into the army. This topic continues to spark lively debate many years after the introduction of the mandatory military service law, suggesting that it remains a divisive issue and far from being taken for granted by Druze youth today. The depth of this division is highlighted by the even 50-50 split among participants on the matter of military service: 16 participants (9 females and 7 males) opposed the recruitment of Druze into the army, while 16 (8 females and 8 males) were in favour. Notably, we found no significant differences in the views of those who had served in the military compared to those who had not.
For example, Zuheir opposes military service on moral grounds:
“I believe that there should be reciprocity between the State and the citizen…in my opinion in every country the citizen should serve the State in order to enable the State to serve the citizen. But Israel is an exceptional case because there were Arabs here and the Jews came and created a State… and since we are a part of the Arab people, and since the Arab people in Israel cannot serve in the army because it means carrying arms against other Arab people, we too should not serve in the army.”
One of the main concerns raised by opponents of military service is the harm it causes to relations with other Arabs.
“The Druze pay a very high price for their enlistment in the army. They not only pay with the loss of lives. They also pay a high price socially in regards to their relations with other Arab communities and with the Arab people at large. Despite this heavy price in my opinion, the Druze have not received what they entitled to receive from the State until today.” (Husni).
A central argument put forward by opponents is the claim that there is no meaningful return for the heavy price the Druze have paid:
“What has service in the army done for us? It caused us problems with the rest of the Arabs. They look at us as traitors because of our service in the army and on the other hand we don’t receive appropriate treatment from the Jews.” (Ibtisam).
Amin experienced it brutally:
“On the day of my discharge I was wearing my uniform on the way to the induction center. A [Jewish] religious guy sat next to me on the bus and began to tell me how ‘you Druze help us and we should love you and blah, blah, blah.’ On my way back after I had returned my uniform I sat next to this other Jewish guy and, exhausted, I nodded off. My head must have landed on him for a split second and he looked at me and said ‘stinking Arab’.”
Many of those in favor of the Druze doing military service cited pragmatic motives:
“I think, if I didn’t stand a chance of studying, I’d go into the army because a person wants to live. The army is first and foremost an economic matter. The army today, I’m telling you, doesn’t need any of us Druze.”
There are those who take military service for granted, as a natural part of being a citizen. A citizen in their opinion serves his country:
“Military service is an obligation for every citizen in any nation, in order for them to defend their borders… it can’t be that other people will come and defend their villages…” (Suheir).
The army made us more Israeli
Thirty-one participants attempted to describe how military service has shaped the identity of Druze in Israel. There was a noticeable difference between the perspectives of male and female students. Without exception, the women observed that, on the one hand, military service diminishes the Arab identity of Druze soldiers, while on the other hand, it makes them more Israeli. From the women’s perspective, it was evident that military service has a decisive impact on the identity of young Druze in Israel.
“Of course, this makes us different from the Arabs in Israel. This is what gave the Arabs the opinion they have of us. This is the main thread in our identity. Everything else revolves around this and in my opinion, it’s central” (Afnan).
Rula knows where army service is taking the Druze community and how it influences the way Druze see themselves:
“I don’t go to the army, so I define myself as a Druze Arab Israeli. A Druze guy who goes to the army defines himself as a Druze Israeli. He cancels out the Arab part of him entirely, as if he’d been brainwashed.”
Ihlam gives an example of the process of Israelization that the Druze soldier undergoes, referring to the language that the Druze speak upon their return from the army:
“Even the language. We’ve stopped speaking the Arabic language and we’ve begun to speak more Hebrew. Why? Because the army influences our soldiers, and even the soldiers’ mothers.”
Husni also claimed that the army causes youth to feel more like Israeli Druze rather than Arabs:
“The army distances us from our Arabness. Some of the youth have this illusion that our nationalism is Druze rather than Arab. They don’t succeed in understanding that their Druze identity is not a nationalist one and that our national identity is Arab.”
Equal only in obligations
All of the participants, both those in favour of military service and those against, expressed disappointment and frustration over the fact that Druze youth serve in the army, even risking their lives for the country, yet the state does not treat them as equals. They are often viewed no differently from other Arabs who do not perform military service. In this regard, In’am states: “Our goal is to reach a point where we receive all our rights here, but that’s still a long way off. We live like any other Arab in Israel.”
Nasser continues this sentiment, offering an example of how the Druze are treated similarly to other Arabs:
“The State does not distinguish between us and other Arabs. For example they expropriated our land. Look at the whole issue of development in our towns and in the Jewish towns next to us. We receive a negligible part of the budget. For example, investment from the State Lottery funds – they hardly built us a community center or sports hall. In Nesher (a Jewish city), for example they have six community centers…”
Hanan defines the status of the Druze in Israel as third and even fourth class:
“First of all, regarding decision-making, we the Druze are not a part of it. Second of all the State doesn’t look at me as a citizen who deserves all of the rights. They always point out that rights come with obligations. We fulfill all of our obligations and we don’t receive our rights.”
Inad claims that not only are the Druze excluded as partners in the decision-making processes, but that the Druze do not even exist in the eyes of the State:
“In the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel the Druze are not mentioned. Some time ago a book was published in honor of the fiftieth year of the State and no trace of the Druze appears in it. That’s to say that they don’t recognize our existence at all. When do they remember us? In the “blood alliance.” That’s to say that when a Druze soldier is killed, they remember us. For years and years, we have been struggling without success to achieve an alliance of life.”
Amal is not surprised by the State’s discrimination against the Druze. He also knows the reason for it. The main reason in his opinion is because the State is a Jewish State:
“They say, fulfill your obligations to the State and you will receive equality. For fifty years we’ve been fulfilling our obligations and we still demand our rights. And until today you hear someone like the Minister of Education say I’m proud to be an extremist Jew and that the State is the State of the Jews and not of anyone else…and the question is how this minister regards me as a Druze who serves in the army… or how an officer of the IDF stands up and says we’re recruiting the Druze into the army so that they don’t go and serve with Hamas. That puts me in a dilemma. Why do I need to serve the country?”
Discussion
It is important to recognise that conscript armies carefully assess and categorise manpower, drafting some while excluding others, thereby reinforcing boundaries between ‚us‘ and ‚them.‘[69] Overall, military manpower policies are widely seen as having significant implications for citizenship. As noted, liberal democracies tend to assume a close connection between citizens’ willingness to ‚voluntarily‘ enlist in the army and their entitlement to rights[70]. However, while liberal democracies aspire to provide equal rights to all citizens, this remains more of an ideal than a fully realised reality. Either by choice or necessity, the interviewees appear to align with a stance known as the ‘republican exchange,’ where the state mobilises its citizens to sacrifice in war in return for rights and protection. Our Druze respondents do not object to this republican, collective expectation, nor do they adopt a liberal critique of it. Their frustration lies in the lack of reciprocity. The expected exchange is not functioning as promised. They are acutely aware that, in comparison to Jewish casualties and general participation in the army, the Druze sacrifice more, making this absence of reciprocity even more disheartening.
The respondents also emphasised their awareness of the price they pay in relation to their Arab identity by serving in the military. The Jewish state has them caught in a double bind. Although the military has implemented partially inclusive policies by opening its ranks to the Druze, these liberal manpower policies are based on identity politics designed to fragment the Arab community in Israel. The Druze are offered the chance to be included as full citizens by joining the military, yet find themselves rejected, returning to an Arab Palestinian identity that historically was not their preferred choice.
While they acknowledge the material benefits of military service, they are distressed that these benefits do not extend to the civic sphere. The state recognises equality in terms of obligations, but equal rights in terms of rewards are never realised. This failure represents a stark violation of the republican contract between the state and its citizens.
It is worth emphasizing that the case of the Druze partially support Krebs[71] arguments regarding the centrality of the politics of communal identities in the liberalizing of the military’s manpower policies. However, for the Druze, this advancement applies only within the armed forces. While Druze have been, and continue to be, promoted through all ranks of the military, this progress is often reversed when they return to civilian life. This should not come as a surprise in the State of Israel, given its strong ethno-republican orientation. What distinguishes the Druze case is that, unlike other minorities seeking equality, who understood the republican mechanism and voluntarily sought ways to be drafted and partially benefited from this exchange (e.g., Blacks, Latinos), the Druze were coerced into conscription and subsequently betrayed by the hegemonic power.
The decision to single out the Druze for mandatory military service, setting them apart from other Arabs in the country, was not intended to integrate them as equal citizens. Instead, it was a strategy to divide and weaken the Arab minority. The introduction of compulsory service was politically motivated, serving the interests of the State and its ruling Jewish majority rather than those of the Druze. Initially, the Druze opposed military service, but over time it became an accepted reality. In recent years, Druze youth have been drawn to military service for both economic reasons and the social status it offers. For Druze youth, military service provides a stable and respectable source of income, particularly for officers, who can advance economically and integrate into the middle class.
This is consistent with research conducted on minority groups in the United States military service[72], and it explains the high percentage of Druze serving in the various military branches. Yet, the Druze are becoming increasingly aware and resentful of the unfulfilled promises made to them.
Levy’s concept of convertibility helps in understanding these developments. Levy demonstrated that in the Israeli context, the benefits of convertibility have radically shifted with the processes of demilitarisation and remilitarisation that have characterised Israeli society over the past few decades. Demilitarisation has become the preferred path for the dominant groups, while peripheral groups, in search of legitimacy and rights, have turned to the military, making it an arena of intergroup conflict. In this process, the military has partially lost its central social role, while peripheral groups seek to slow demilitarisation in order to preserve convertibility as much as possible. This process has been accompanied by a rise in ethnocentrism.
As militarisation declines, so do levels of convertibility. The sources of prestige shift, and not all sectors of society are able to adapt. Even if they recognise this shift, some may not have the option to realign, as the military remains one of the few paths available to improve their social position. The Druze are such a minority, for whom the military remains the only viable route to legitimising their status in Israeli society. As the dominant sectors of society shift towards non-military arenas, taking with them the potential convertible values, the military sphere becomes increasingly ethnocentric. The Druze’s position in the military, already fragile, may weaken further in light of these new processes of demilitarisation and the rising ethnocentrism in Israeli society.
One interviewee remarked that military service is like a ticket, or an insurance policy, granting entry into Israeli society. However, this ticket still comes with limitations. While it facilitates integration into Israeli society on an individual and social level—making the Druze more accepted by Jews compared to other Arabs—it remains ineffective when it comes to more significant issues, such as the distribution of resources, land, planning, and construction. In these critical matters, central to the Jewish State, the Druze are treated no differently from other Arabs. This has been a source of frustration and anger among Druze youth, as reflected in our interviews. The growing disappointment and anger stem from the gap between their expectations and their social reality, a tension that has been intensifying over the years.
Today, Druze youth have become ‚Israelis,‘ largely due to their military service. They have adopted Western Jewish culture and behaviour, becoming more individualistic and self-confident in their interactions with others. They are also more aware of their rights and are unwilling to settle for anything less than full equality with their Jewish peers.[73].
Recent research in the field consistently demonstrates that, despite their disappointment and frustration, the Druze still aspire to integrate fully into Israeli society. They wish to be Israeli in every sense of the word and, as citizens of Israel, they seek equality with Jews in all respects. However, it is difficult to foresee the Druze achieving these aspirations in the near future. The Jewish State, as conceived historically and in its current form by its hegemonic powers, appears fundamentally incapable of fully including any non-Jewish minority group or individual.
In summary, the recruitment of the Druze into the Israeli military created an expectation of integration and equality—an expectation that seems unattainable as long as Israel remains defined as a Jewish State. The Druze were recruited not out of a desire for their full inclusion, but from a narrow political motivation to divide and better control the Arab minority. This has led to a situation that is both complex and, arguably, untenable.
Until 2018, many young Druze harboured hopes of becoming equal citizens and fully identifying as Israelis, but the passage of the Nation-State Law shattered this illusion. It is now clear to all that the State of Israel is, first and foremost, a Jewish State, and as such, cannot fully include non-Jews, even the Druze, who serve in its military. This bleak reality has become even more pronounced in recent years, as the extreme right-wing forces that control the country steer it in a Messianic-Fascist direction, placing even the fragile democracy that existed—primarily for Jews—at risk.
Lastly, I must emphasise that this study is based on interviews with small groups of young Druze, and as such, the findings should be interpreted with caution. Further qualitative and quantitative research is needed to validate these results.
[1] SNYDER 2003; TILLY 1995.
[2] LEVY 2005; HERZOG 1985.
[3] SHAFIR and PELED, 2002.
[4] LEVY 2005; RAM 2008.
[5] MIROVSKY 2020.
[6] KREBS 2004.
[7] HALL 2011; SCHOUTEN 2004.
[8] LUTZ 2008
[9] ELDER 1987
[10] LUTS 2010.
[11] LUNDQUIST 2008; SAMPSON and LAUB 1996; DANDEKER and MASON 2001.
[12] WERTSCH 2011.
[13] LUNDQUEST 2008; TEACHMAN and TEDROW 2008; WOODWARD and WINTER 2006.
[14] KLEYKAMP 2007.
[15]BARLEY 1998.
[16] BEN-SHALOM 2012; MOSKOS 2007.
[17] JONES 1985.
[18] JANOWITZS 1976, 1964.
[19] BURK 2002.
[20] SNEDER 2003; KRONSELL2012.
[21] GUZMAN 1976.
[22] SHKLAR 1991.
[23]ELDER 1987; SAMPSON and LAUB 1996.
[24] BOND, 1998; SANBORN 2003.
[25] FORD1997.
[26] FLIGSTEIN 1980.
[27] KANE 2006.
[28] QUSTER 2009.
[29]BATALOVA 2008.
[30]DANDEKER and MASON 2001.
[31] KHALIDI 2001.
[32] AMOR 2009.
[33] PELED 992.
[34] KERBER 1997.
[35] BARBALET 1988.
[36] BENDIX 1996.
[37] HOLM 1992; SEGAL 1989.
[38] KERBS 2005.
[39] YAGIL LEVY 1998.
[40] LEVY 1998.
[41] LEVY 2003.
[42] ROISLIEN 2013.
[43] CENTRAL BUERAU of STATISTICS 2023.
[44] HALABI 2014.
[45] ABU-SAAD 2004; GHANEM 998.
[46] HALABI 2014.
[47] ZEEDAN 2015.
[48] FIRRO 1999; PARSONS 2000.
[49] FIRRO 1984, 1999.
[50] PARSONS 2000.
[51] ZEEDAN, 2015.
[52] HALABI 1997.
[53]HALABI 2014.
[54] NISAN 2010.
[55] RADAI, ELRAN, and YOUSEF, 2015.
[56] ZEEDAN 2015.
[57] KHNIFESS 2015.
[58] ROISLIEN 2013, 2017.
[59] DELUTY and ROSE 2014.
[60] HASAN 1992.
[61] LEVANON and RAVIV 2007.
[62] HAJJAR 2000.
[63] SCHWADT 1998.
[64] SEIDMAN 1991.
[65] BOGDAN and BIKELAN 1992.
[66] ATKINSON and FLINT 2001.
[67] BOGDAN and BIKLEN 1992.
[68] TSANG 2013.
[69] ROISLIENl 2013.
[70] JANOWITS 1964, 1976.
[71] KERBS 2005.
[72] LUTS 2008, 2010a.
[73] HALABI 2014.
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