DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7160/KS.2020.140103
Author: Michael Řehák
Address: Czech University of Life Sciences, Kamýcká 129, Prague, Czech Rep.
E-mail: michael747rehak@gmail.com
Language: Czech
Issue: 1/2020
Page Range: 35–61
No. of Pages: 25
Keywords: Influence, political influence, economical influence, minority, language minority, propaganda, disinformation, Baltic states
Abstract: This paper explores the influence of the Russian Federation in three states of the Baltic region in the context of disinformation campaigns. These campaigns are one of the means used to regain the influence lost after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The main part of the paper is devoted to discussing the fight against disinformation campaigns conducted by the Russian Federation in individual states. It addresses this from the point of view of the local population, whose opinions were obtained in field research conducted over the last two years (i.e., 2018 to 2020). Also subjected to analysis are the views of corresponding national and supranational authorities.
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Introduction
This article examines the influence of the Russian Federation in the three states of the Baltic region in the context of disinformation campaigns, which are one of the means of trying to regain lost influence after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The theoretical part introduces basic theoretical concepts related to the topic under study, such as the definition of the concept of disinformation or the concept of small states from the perspective of the European Union, among which Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia can be included. The practical part of the thesis is devoted to the issue of combating disinformation campaigns disseminated by the Russian Federation in individual states. Firstly, from the perspective of the local population, whose opinions were obtained in the field research from 2018 to 2020, as well as the corresponding authorities of the national and supranational level.
The fate of the three small nations inhabiting the land bathed by the Baltic Sea has not always been easy. Although geographically quite close, Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, is roughly as far away from Prague as the popular Mediterranean areas for summer holidays of the Czechs, the region is perceived as remote in the context of the Czech Republic, and at the same time closely linked to the Russian Federation.
The ties of the local peoples to the various forms of the Russian state are clearly evident from history. Today’s Latvia and Estonia were part of Tsarist Russia for almost 200 years. However, the three Baltic countries achieved independence after World War I, and for a time the link with Russia, then in the form of the USSR, was severed. The most important period for the background of this scholarly work is the following period, when all the Baltic republics became union republics, and were part of the USSR. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union that restored independence to the region, and efforts began in the restored states to change their orientation from total dependence on Russia to integration into the European Community. These efforts culminated in 2004 when all three Baltic States became part of the European Union and NATO.
However, even after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation is still interested in maintaining influence in the countries that have become independent, referring to them in official terminology as ‚near neighbours‘. The motives for seeking to maintain influence in each country vary; given the small mineral reserves in the region, this motive can be virtually ruled out; on the other hand, even in the context of history, access to Baltic Sea seaports such as Tallinn or Klajpeda in Lithuania is important for the Russian Federation. One important component of influence in the Baltic States is the ethnic composition of the population of each state. In Estonia and Latvia, ethnic Russians make up more than a quarter of the total population. Often these are people who use Russian as their primary language. They either do not speak the local language at all or try not to use it as a form of protest against the local authorities. This situation opens up space for the Russian Federation to gain influence in countries such as Latvia and Lithuania through non-violent methods in the form of soft power.
Methodology
Working with secondary sources of data is considered as the basis for the creation of this scientific text. In contrast to the study of primary data, this is a process that does not involve direct contact with the narrators and is therefore a non-invasive data collection technique. However, in order to achieve relevant research results, it is necessary to focus on triangulation of the methods used, i.e. both within-method triangulation and between-method triangulation.[1]
Due to the fact that each method of data collection has its positive as well as negative aspects, the combination of using several research methods will ensure its higher validity.
In accordance with the principle of triangulation of methods, it is necessary to use other research methods to ensure the validity of the data collected during the research. In the case of this research paper, two types of interviews were conducted, namely narrative interview and guided interview in the field research conducted between 2018 and 2020. In total, sixteen interviews were conducted with narrators from all three Baltic States during this period.
In order to carry out the aforementioned field research across the region of the Baltic States, it was necessary to establish contact with relevant organisations, one of which is the Czech-Estonian Club, which was founded in 1991 and serves as a means of bringing together friends of the northernmost Baltic State. A Facebook page set up by the club has made it possible to get in touch with Estonians living in both the Czech Republic and Estonia. The club actively cooperates with the Embassy of the Republic of Estonia in Prague (Eesti Suursaatkond Praha), for example, in organising the cultural event Estonian Days in Prague. We can also mention the club’s publication activities, in particular the book Little Estonia in Bohemia from 2008, which deals with the club’s functioning and other activities. The Czech-Latvian Association is the medium for gaining contacts with the Latvian community. Its history dates back to 1990. Since 1993, there has been close cooperation between the association and the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in Prague, which led to the establishment of the Latvian Cultural Centre at the Embassy. Similarly to the Czech-Latvian Club, the Czech-Latvian Association has also been involved in publishing activities. It is possible to mention the person of Mgr. Pavel Štoll, Ph.D., the President of the Czech-Latvian Association. With his contribution, a publication entitled Experience and Relations was published in 2013. Latvian and Czech Society in the 20th Century.
Last but not least, it is necessary to mention the acquisition of contacts through social networks. The social network Reddit has been the best tool for this research, and there are interest groups for all three Baltic countries within its scope (Latvia[2], Lithuania[3] and Estonia[4]) where members answer a wide range of questions about the country and current affairs. Following the creation of a discussion thread describing the issues under study, the researcher was contacted by several individuals who were willing to participate in the research by completing narrative and guided interviews. A similar source of individuals willing to participate in the research was the interest groups on Facebook. Examples include the group called „Laulupidu/Estonia photos and news“, the group „Baltica“ whose members share news about current events in the Baltic States, and the group „Latvian interests“ aimed at those interested in Latvian culture.
Theoretical background
In order to understand the issue of the Russian Federation’s influence in the context of the Baltic States, it is necessary to define several theoretical concepts such as propaganda, disinformation, the concept of the small state and the concept of soft power.
The roots of the word propaganda go back to the Latin verb propagare, whose original meaning is related to biology and means to propagate or spread. The Latin origin of the word is related to its use during the 17th century by church dignitaries, specifically Pope Gregory XV. He established the institution of the „Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide“, whose aim was the education of missionaries and the related spread of Catholicism in countries of other faiths.
During this period, the word propaganda was perceived as connotationally neutral, and was used practically only in a religious context. It was not until the 19th century that a shift in meaning occurred, and the word propaganda was first used in a political context. One possible source of the use of the word in a political context can be seen in the words of Milliard Fillmore on the floor of the US Congress in 1852, pointing out that it was impossible for a nation to become a propagandist for the principles of liberty without turning against the combined forces of Europe.[5]
According to the Great Sociological Dictionary, the term propaganda refers to a term used primarily in the sense of the deliberate, institutionalized dissemination of politically oriented ideas, practices, entire ideologies, political doctrines and theories to a wider or narrower public. At the same time, it also includes their tendentious explanation and modification into a form adapted to the current situation.
On this basis, we can identify five basic characteristics of propaganda. The first characteristic is that propaganda informs about the most actual phenomena with political and ideological content and scope and interprets them in the spirit of the respective ideology and political line. Propaganda can also be described as a vehicle for mobilising the masses to come out in support of a particular policy. Another characteristic of propaganda is the dissemination of basic ideological postulates, values or stereotypes that characterise the various social objectives of a particular party, state, political institution or other social group. At the same time, it explicitly and implicitly links them to a particular worldview. Propaganda also creates general patterns of reactions to social phenomena that go beyond learned attitudes and stereotypes, such as passivity, inattention, hectic excitement and expectation. One cannot overlook the fact that propaganda paralyses and upsets foreign ideological schemes, which leads to the demobilisation and intimidation of its opponents. A common feature of propaganda resulting from the above is the general ideologisation and politicisation of reality.[6]
Contemporary propaganda in the context of the Russian Federation reflects to some extent the aspects of communication from the Soviet era, but due to the development of communication technologies and globalisation they have evolved.
Soviet propaganda can be described as organised action, whereas the contemporary propaganda used by the Russian Federation is more appropriately described as a coordinated campaign, which better defines the dynamic nature of the construction of contemporary propaganda narratives. In practice, the above corresponds to a situation where the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Maria Zakharova, repeats the narratives used by Vladimir Putin during a regular weekly press conference, or a situation where Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov quotes Russia Today (RT) during a press conference regarding the war in Syria.
The most common themes used to spread Russian narratives include the following.
The case of „Russophobia“ highlights the connection between historical discourse and contemporary Russian propaganda narratives. The concept of Russophobia is not an invention of Vladimir Putin’s regime, nor of the preceding Soviet state. The concept is first used in the 19th century by a tsarist diplomat to reflect on the classical narrative used by Russia, which proclaims that the „West“ will use any opportunity to marginalize and exclude Russia.
The concept of Russophobia allows Putin to challenge virtually any accusation made by Western powers under the pretext of using the stereotype of Russophobia.
The use of the phrase ‚very likely‘, on the other hand, is a demonstration of Russia’s flexibility in creating narratives. An example is the sarcastic use of the hashtag ‚highly likely‘ on the social network Twitter within the official accounts of the Russian Federation. The Russians started using it in official communications after British Prime Minister Theresa May’s statement referring to the fact that Russia was very likely behind the poisoning of former Russian agent Sergei Skripal.
The Russians present „very likely“ as one of the natural symptoms of Russophobia. Both concepts serve to create doubt about the leaders of Western powers, and feed the narrative of Russia’s struggle against the rest of the world.[7]
According to research by the Oxford English Dictionary, the word disinformation first appears in an English text on 3 June 1955 in The Times. Its linguistic origin is most likely derived from the Russian „дезинформация“ (transliterated as dezinformatsiya).[8]
According to the terminology of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (MoI CR), the term disinformation means the dissemination of deliberately false information, especially by state actors or their offshoots towards a foreign state or the media, with the aim of influencing decision-making and opinions.
Similar to disinformation is the term „misinformation“. In the case of misinformation, it is also information that is incorrect or misleading. However, unlike misinformation, it is also a type of news that is not disseminated systematically or with the intention of influencing the decisions or opinions of its recipients. Despite the fact that it is a neutral phenomenon, in cases where such news is disseminated on a mass scale without being corrected or set straight in any way, misinformation can act in the same way as disinformation.
However, in the current era of advanced manipulation techniques, it is necessary to take into account that there are many transitions or common occurrences between misinformation and disinformation where we are unable to distinguish the difference.[9]
The term „soft power“ first appeared in scientific discourse in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War. The term is defined as the ability of one actor to influence the behaviour of others. Unlike other theories, it deals with attraction, not coercion, which is typical of ‚hard power‘. As an example, consider a situation in the field of international relations, where state A tries to influence state B by exerting soft power. By doing so, State B voluntarily acts to change its behaviour in favour of State A.[10]
The concept of soft power is built on three basic pillars: culture, political values and foreign policy.
On the question of culture, it is necessary to distinguish between several forms of this concept. Culture can be seen as high culture, which includes literature, art and education, which is the target of elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment. An example of popular culture that is internationally disseminated is American culture as portrayed in film and music production. However, in order to use culture as a soft power, it is necessary to ensure that the state behaves in accordance with the ideals presented, both internally and externally.
Political values, both domestic and foreign, are another potential source of soft power. An example is the policy of racial segregation in the 1950s in the USA. This policy greatly undermined the US position in Africa. A similar example can be seen in the US stance on gun legislation, which undermines soft power in Europe.
The third pillar of soft power is foreign policy, which must be seen as a moral authority with assured legitimacy. An example of this is the foreign policy in the form of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This proved to be a failure and greatly influenced the perception of the country and its foreign policy.[11]
Disinformation in the context of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
In the Conclusions of the European Council of 19 and 20 March 2015, the following is noted in the area of Russia/Ukraine:
„The European Council stressed the need to counter Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns and invited the High Representative to prepare an action plan for strategic communication in cooperation with Member States and EU institutions by June. In this context, the establishment of a communication team is a first step.“[12]
This conclusion of the European Council led to the establishment of the East Stratcom Task Force within the European External Action Service. The objectives of this organisation include the following:
- Effective communication and promotion of EU policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood
- Strengthening the media space within the European Union and the Eastern Neighbourhood
- Improving the ability to predict, assess and respond to disinformation activities of external actors
For example, the EUvsDisinfo project, which seeks to raise awareness of the risks of disinformation and understanding of the workings of pro-Kremlin disinformation policies, is being set up. These actions should lead to an improvement in the population’s resilience to disinformation and media manipulation. In addition to the above-mentioned initiative, it manages the Russian-language version of the European External Action Service website, which provides information on EU activities and policies relevant to both its members and its eastern neighbours.[13]
The European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on strategic EU communication to counter third-party propaganda against the EU addresses the following. The Russian Federation uses contacts and meetings with EU counterparts to propagandise and publicly weaken the EU’s common position rather than to establish a genuine dialogue. The Russian government uses a wide range of tools and means, such as multilingual television stations (e.g. RT) or alleged news agencies and multimedia services (e.g. Sputnik).[14]
The EU’s efforts to combat disinformation resulted in the creation of the European Commission’s Disinformation Action Plan in 2018. The Action Plan itself consists of four main pillars:
- Improving the ability of Union institutions to detect, analyse and highlight disinformation
- Strengthening coordinated and joint responses to disinformation
- Mobilizing the private sector to combat disinformation
- Raising awareness and improving community resilience
In the long term, the EU should seek to build greater resilience to disinformation, and to this end support education and media literacy in society, independent journalism, fact-checking projects, researchers and civil society.[15]
Disinformation in Lithuania
According to the 2018 Final Report of the Lithuanian State Security Department, Lithuania and its population face a number of security risks. One of the most significant risks is the Russian Federation’s drive to gain geopolitical influence throughout the Baltic region.
The Russian Federation seeks to discredit Lithuania, for example, by bending the meaning of illegal incidents by far-right groups in the country to present them as Russophobic attacks on the Russian minority. However, the individual cases of violations of the law were not classified as Russophobic and did not give rise to suspicions about the rise of political extremism in the country. The persons involved in the incidents in question are well known to the Lithuanian authorities as recidivists who engage in events with great media interest. They thus serve the interests of the Russian Federation to spread the narrative of a threat to the Russian-speaking minority in the country.[16]
A narrator from Vilnius confirms the report of the Lithuanian security forces: „When there is a major national holiday in the country, especially I think on 11 March, apart from people celebrating the restoration of an independent Lithuania, various extremist groups take to the streets and behave in a very nationalistic way, which of course leads to Russia saying that we are fundamentally against minorities in the country and that we oppress Russians and Poles.“
The usual propaganda tool of the Russian Federation is the involvement of high-ranking Russian politicians in spreading disinformation about Lithuania. As an example, in a report from September 2019, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, in her statements, fundamentally refused to refer to the period when the Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union as a period of occupation.[17]
The propaganda disseminated by the Russian Federation in Lithuania aims to mislead the population and divide society, with the main group targeted by the disinformation being those using Russian-language information sources operating in the country. On the basis of the disinformation disseminated, Lithuania is portrayed as an unreliable and aid-dependent country with no clear origin of its statehood. A significant feature of the disinformation disseminated in the country is the attempt to portray Lithuania as an enemy and a threat to the Russian Federation, a narrative that is largely set in the context of Lithuania’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Another theme of disinformation in the country is the attempt to present the Russian-speaking minority as persecuted by the Lithuanian authorities, as well as the attempt to promote the narrative of the rise of Nazism in the country.[18]
Currently, there are several initiatives in Lithuania to combat disinformation, both at the state level and at the level of private sector or volunteer efforts.
Although Lithuania has the lowest proportion of ethnic minority Russians in the total population of all the Baltic states, it can certainly not be said that the issue of disinformation campaigns has not received attention in the country.
In 2018, former Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė commented on the adoption of the EU Action Plan to combat disinformation as follows:
„Lithuania’s experience in public-private cooperation and the initiatives of the media, which together fight against disinformation in the information fields, can be very valuable in the context of the whole Union.“[19]
Her statement drew attention to the Lithuanian NGO project Demaskuok.lt (Debunk.eu). A project of this type is somewhat unique in the fight against disinformation, as it combines four components:
- The seven biggest media players in Lithuania (TV and radio stations, newspapers and online news)
- Three strategic communications groups (Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- „Elf“ community volunteers, researchers (resource verification experts)
- Experienced IT experts (development of artificial intelligence mechanisms)
Debunk.eu uses advanced algorithms and analytical tools to identify misinformation within two minutes of publication. Identified sources are then vetted by human volunteers and journalists from the participating media. The organisations involved in the project include the news server Delfi, the television station LRT, the radio station Žinių radijas and the daily Lietuvos rytas.[20]
A teacher from Šauliai informs about her view on the existence of Debunk.eu: „I am very proud that something like this has been created in our country. The form and presentation is very gripping for the public, because it is not just experts sitting behind monitors somewhere in a ministry, but also people who can be contacted via social networks. I think that Kaliningrad is a big motivation for the creation of such initiatives. None of us really know what Russia is hiding there.[21] Partly we live in permanent fear, and we are trying to fight problems that the West has not yet solved because it is too far away for it.“
However, Debunk.eu is not the only fact-checking initiative in Lithuania. Ahead of the 2016 Lithuanian parliamentary elections, the popular online news server 15min.lt launched Patikrinta 15min (translated as „checked in 15 minutes“). Its main goal is to check statements published in the Lithuanian media space, whether they are statements by Lithuanian politicians or disinformation spread at the initiative of the Kremlin.[22]
In addition to fact-checking initiatives, there are also efforts in Lithuania to increase media literacy among the population. One example is the „Media and information literacy education project in Lithuania“, which was established with the support of the Lithuanian Ministry of Education. Its aim was to create a unified system for teaching media literacy in Lithuanian primary schools and then incorporate it into the school curriculum.[23]
The narrator from Lithuania highlights the need to implement similar projects in teaching: „If schools continue to expand the teaching of critical thinking, the use of more than one source of information, as well as questioning oneself about the meaning of the information presented, I think the likelihood of outside influences influencing the population will at least be reduced.“
An important element in the fight against disinformation is the involvement of civil society. Within Lithuania, this takes the form of an informal organisation that calls itself the Lithuanian Elfs.
The Lithuanian Elfs are volunteer members of the public who act as a counterweight to the trolls spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda. At the beginning, twenty to thirty people joined the initiative, drawing each other’s attention, for example, to comments under Lithuanian media articles on social media. Subsequently, they offer alternative opinions to the comments posted by pro-Kremlin trolls. However, the members of the group try to avoid a dogmatic tone when posting the comments in question, which would turn them into creators of reverse propaganda. Nowadays, their reach has extended to the whole region and nearby Scandinavian countries. Consequently, this also leads to the involvement of people who do not subscribe to the Lithuanian Elfs, but try to ensure a balanced media space. Some of the Lithuanian Elfs are even actively involved in street protests to refute pro-Russian narratives, similar to what they do on the internet. However, such actions carry a number of risks for them, in particular the loss of anonymity and the possibility of physical assault.[24]
One of the Lithuanian Elfs is the narrator Liamas: „I currently live in Dublin, but very often spend time in Kaunas, you could say I am a Lithuanian elf in exile. I’m sure it’s easy for you to understand my situation, why I’m so cautious. I am often the victim of cyber attacks from Glavset[25], especially their branch in St. Petersburg. Two years ago I was working independently in the community, but I was hacked from somewhere in Russia. As a result, I joined an imaginary organization and I try to protect myself against them by using strong encryption and antivirus.“
However, the Vilnius banker is critical of the Lithuanian Elfs movement: „It’s such a nice subject for a report for the Western media to think that this will solve something, but what impact can it have when someone is arguing with someone on the internet? I’ve spoken to a couple of their representatives, and the impression I get is that they are replacing Putin’s propaganda with their own.“
In February 2018, the Lithuanian Radio and Television Council (LRTK) decided to suspend the broadcasting of the Swedish-registered Russian-language television station RTR Planeta on the basis of three identified incidents in which threats were made to destroy the United States of America, rebuild the USSR or occupy the Baltic States.[26]
The case is also mentioned by the student Vasillis from Vilnius: „RTR Planeta is a pro-Russian news outlet that has been broadcasting here for at least ten, fifteen years. After what happened in Ukraine, it seemed to me that the whole campaign gained momentum, which led to the government wanting to ban them back in 2015, but it didn’t work. It was only later, I think it was in 2018, but the EU had to step in.“
The decision to suspend RTR Planeta’s broadcasts in Lithuania for a year reached the European Commission, which subsequently ruled in May 2018 that the Lithuanian authorities‘ statement was in line with EU law and that the ban was therefore valid.[27]
Frequent topics of disinformation campaigns in Lithuania
Variace témat dezinformací šířených Ruskou federací je velmi široká, jak informuje Koncept litevské národní bezpečnosti na počátku kapitoly. Narátoři v rámci rozhovorů jako dezinformační média působící v Litvě nejčastěji jmenovali internetové zpravodajské servery RT.com, Sputniknews.lt a Rubaltic.ru.
An illustrative example of the manipulation of public opinion is an article published on 16 January 2016 on the Rubaltic.ru server with the headline „The Americans are Considering Excluding the Baltics from NATO“.[28]
Obsahem článku je úvaha rozebírající pozici Spojených států amerických v rámci NATO, a její domnělou nevýhodnost. Autor článku, Alexandr Nosovič, odkazuje na skutečnost, že názory publikované v článku jsou pohledem prestižního amerického magazínu Forbes, což v článku doplňuje i zdrojem. Zdroj skutečně odkazuje na článek publikovaný na webové stránce magazínu Forbes, avšak jedná se pouze o úvahu přispěvovatele Douga Bandowa v rámci sekce blogových příspěvků. Příspěvky v této sekci jsou označeny upozorněním, že za jejich obsah magazín neodpovídá, a nemusí vyjadřovat postoje magazínu Forbes. Tón článku se čtenáře snaží manipulovat použitím zdánlivě důvěryhodného zdroje, a zejména vytvořením strachu z ničím nepodloženého ohrožení.
However, information sources containing manipulative content are not necessarily just disinformation sites such as Rubaltic.ru or Sputniknews.lt. One example is the RIA Novosti website, one of the most popular Russian-language sources in the country.
On October 24, 2019, RIA Novosti published a report with the headline „Largest troop redeployment. What are US tanks doing near the border with Belarus?“ (Крупнейшая переброска войск. Что делают у границ Белоруссии танки США)[29] whose author is Anton Lysicin. The content of the article is then a reflection on the presence of NATO troops in Lithuania, where, according to the author’s assumptions, military units are waiting for orders to start action against Belarus and subsequently the Russian Federation. A similar narrative is very common in the disinformation campaigns of the Russian Federation. The North Atlantic Alliance has responded to such efforts with several means. One of these is the publication of semi-annual plans for NATO military exercises, describing their content, the date and location of the event.[30]
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, one of the most frequent topics of the Russian Federation’s disinformation campaigns is the issue of the country’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. However, Russian propaganda also focuses on Lithuania’s internal politics.
On January 6, 2019, Sputniknews.lt published an article with the headline „Media: US soldiers tore down Lithuanian flag from Kaunas prosecutor’s building“ (JAV kariai nuplėšė Lietuvos vėliavą nuo Kauno prokuratūros pastato).[31] The article draws attention to an incident in April 2018, when US soldiers were supposed to tear down the Lithuanian flag from the Kaunas Prosecutor’s Office building and then tear it up. There are several references to sources in the article, namely baltnews.lt and RIA Novosti, but neither of them leads the reader to the original source of the report. In response to the report, the Strategic Communications Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania published a post on the social network Twitter refuting the report, explaining that no US troops have been on the territory of Lithuania since the end of 2017.[32]
The narrators from Lithuania react to the submitted articles after having identified the mentioned sources as spreaders of disinformation.
Lithuanian elf Liamas: „Sputnik is totally obvious, I find it hard to understand that anyone believes it at all, it’s probably people outside my social bubble. If someone ripped a flag off a government building, they would surely be thrown in jail no matter who it was. I haven’t heard of this case, nor have any of my friends. The RIA Novosti report, however, is believable on its face. For a person who is not interested in world events and understands only Russian, this source is certainly very credible. For me, however, it is by no means.“
Narrator from Vilnius: „When I see that it says Forbes, it gives me a sense of credibility. But the site on which it is published already raises doubts, Rubaltic is not as well known as, say, Sputnik, which makes it all the more dangerous in my opinion. The site calls itself an analytical server. The truth is, if it was published by a media outlet like LRT, I’m sure some people would believe it.“
Disinformation in Latvia
Like its southern neighbour, Lithuania, Latvia shares borders with Belarus and the Russian Federation. In contrast to Lithuania, however, is the proportion of ethnic minority Russians in the total population. According to 2017 data, ethnic minority Russians made up 25.4% of the total population. In the same year, more than one third of the population of Latvia considered Russian as their mother tongue.[33]
The importance of this factor is mentioned by the Lithuanian elf Liamas: „In Lithuania, misinformation is not such a problem as it is in Latvia. There are many more people speaking Russian, many more people consuming Russian-language content, many more people with pro-Kremlin websites as their main sources of information.“
The ethnic composition of the country is one of the most important factors. Different languages are used within families. The use of Russian is not only the privilege of the older generation of the population, but within the family it is passed on to the younger generations. The effectiveness of the influence of the Russian Federation on the information space in the country is enhanced by the fact that the availability of Russian-language information resources in the country is at a high level, which leads to the fact that a large part of the population uses them as a primary source of information. A part of the country’s population is also used to watching Russian-language TV channels, as they are included in the packages of TV channels from Latvian satellite providers.[34]
It would seem that the regions geographically close to Russia with a high proportion of ethnic Russians, such as Latgale, where the aforementioned city of Daugavpils is located, would seek a similar fate to that of eastern Ukraine, i.e. annexation to Russia, under the influence of the Russian Federation’s information campaign. However, surveys in the region reveal that although society is sympathetic to pro-Kremlin narratives, mass protests and support for provocations leading to separatist aspirations are unlikely. The majority of the Russian-speaking minority does not want to stand out from the crowd and does not believe that their possible protests would have an impact on changing the situation in the country.[35]
The ethnic group of Russians in Latvia could be divided into three subgroups in relation to the information campaigns of the Russian Federation after the events on the Crimean peninsula. There is a group of pro-European Russians in the country who are loyal to the Latvian state and its existence, and another group of Russians who are not fully integrated into Latvian society, but on the other hand are not in favour of pro-Kremlin activities. The remaining group are Russian compatriots who support the narrative propagated by the pro-Russian media in the country.
The most frequent target of the pro-Kremlin media is a group of ‚neutral‘ Russians who disagree with the current economic situation in the country and also with Latvia’s domestic politics. However, it should be stressed that even this group is not completely homogeneous, and different topics of information campaigns are relevant for different social groups. This fact contradicts the tone of the information disseminated by Russia. It tries to present the Russian-speaking minority in the country as a homogeneous unit that supports the foreign policy of the Russian Federation without reservation.[36]
Narrator Rudolfs from Riga talks about his workplace relationships: „We have a large number of people who consider themselves Russian working in our company, but you would never hear hate speech against Latvia as a country from them, even when they get drunk at a company party. I think they completely ignore public events.“
Narrator Artūras adds: „I have no reason not to believe what the TV tells me.“
Narrator Krisalps comments: „You can tell what someone believes when you go to the pub with them. We talk about public affairs at work, but when it comes to disagreements, we quickly walk away from it because it’s a sensitive subject from a certain point of view. After we have a drink[37], I am yet to learn that Latvia is in crisis because the EU will no longer give it money, and how terribly anti-Russian the Latvian authorities are. When I then ask what their source for this is, they say TV.“
Examples of disinformation disseminated in Latvia
When asked what, in your opinion, is the most frequent subject of disinformation campaigns in Latvia, the translator answers as follows: „Russia tries to present its views as a pro-family policy, for example, through the Russkiy Mir organisation, but in reality they want to gain influence over the diasporas of Russians living abroad.“
One of the most popular Russian-language media outlets in Latvia is bb.lv (Baltic Voice). A common manipulation technique used in the headlines of this source is the dramatisation of news from credible sources.
An example is an article about the production of Latvian state decorations in Lithuania. The news server Latvijas Avīze reported this fact on its website on 5 February 2020 with the headline „Vietējie nevar konkurēt ar Lietuvas milžiem: ordeņus joprojām izgatavos kaimiņos“[38] (Local firms can’t compete with Lithuanian giants, state decorations will continue to be produced in neighbouring country). On 4 March 2020, an article with identical content will be published on the Baltijas Balss server. However, the title of the article is as follows: „Latvijas Avīze печалится: гордость Латвии производят в Литве“ („Latvijas Avīze mourns: the pride of Latvia is made in Lithuania“).[39]
The decision based on economic reasons is interpreted in the Russian-language media as a blow to Latvian identity. Baltijas Balss also has a Latvian language version, but this article is not published in Latvian by bb.lv.
A Latvian student from Daugavpils comments on the case:
„Such rhetoric is common. Then my dad reads it and starts saying that an independent Latvia is incompetent, and it wouldn’t have happened under the USSR.“
The case mentioned above is not an isolated one. Just after the end of the European Parliament elections in 2019, the Baltijas Balss website published an article with the headline „Выборы в Европарламент бойкотировал 1 миллион граждан Латвии“ (translated: 1 million Latvians boycotted the European Parliament elections). The content of the article copies the tone set in the headline, openly claiming that people who did not go to the elections boycotted them, although no evidence is provided for this claim. It then concludes by mentioning that the low turnout confirms how far removed European problems are from those of Latvia. In making these claims, the article completely ignores the fact that Latvia is a full member of the EU.
Both examples of journalistic activity by the most popular Russian-language internet media show an attempt to undermine confidence in an independent Latvia and its membership of the European Community.
In addition to purely political topics, disinformation with cultural overtones can also be observed. An example is the report „Hitler ‚outreads‘ Harry Potter in Latvia“ from 2 April 2018 published by the international version of the disinformation website Sputnik.[40] The article refers to the source Baltnews.lv in the introduction, but it is untraceable. The main focus of the article is to draw attention to the book readership statistics of the website ibook.lv, which acts as an intermediary for book trading in Latvia. In the mentioned statistics, Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf is ranked ahead of the popular fantasy book Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone. The article explains this fact by the Nazi tendencies of the Latvian population. A report containing statements of this type gained the attention of the Western media, leading to a report by the British BBC.[41]
In the report, the owner of ibook.lv, Rita Riskova, explains that most of the clicks on Mein Kampf come from anonymous users, whereas in the case of Harry Potter, it is users registered on ibook.lv. This fact raises the suspicion that the position in the ranking is caused by fake users or internet trolls. Based on investigations such as the one conducted by the British BBC, Sputnik edited the headline of the article from the original misleading version to „Hitler’s ‚Mein Kampf‘ More Popular Than Harry Potter on Latvian Book Site“.
The example given again shows the common theme of the Russian Federation’s influence in trying to portray the country’s population as a radicalising group gravitating towards Nazism.
The narrator from Daugavpils, Latvia, comments on the above case: „I was genuinely amused when this news hit the media, I think every kid our age has read Harry Potter, but I’ve never even seen Mein Kampf in a library or bookstore. But as you know, there are people who believe it, and that’s not funny anymore.“
Disinformation in Estonia
The issue of disinformation is also relevant in the northernmost country in the Baltic region, especially in terms of the country’s well-developed ICT infrastructure.
According to a February 2018 quantitative survey for the European Commission, 73% of Estonian respondents considered disinformation or misinterpretation of reality to be a problem in the country. This is one of the lowest figures in the EU (the highest level of concern – around 90% of respondents – was expressed by residents of Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy and Cyprus), while only respondents from Belgium expressed a lower level of concern about the presentation of reality in online media. On a more general level, only 27% of Estonian respondents consider misinformation and misinterpretation of reality as a serious threat to democracy, the lowest ever across the EU.[42]
In the words of the narrator from Tallinn: Russia is trying to gain influence in the country, but I would say it is not very successful. About two years ago I got a job offer from a media group. When I found out that it was an agency that brokered the operation of Baltnews.ee, I thankfully declined, not wanting to support Russia, even though they promised me a lot of money.
The 2017 Estonian National Security Concept presents security threats in relation to the Euro-Atlantic region and its neighbours. Europe’s security is particularly affected by the increased activity of the Russian Federation in policing, diplomatic, economic and information issues. Furthermore, the chapter on the contemporary environment discusses the transformation of social interactions caused by the development of cyberspace, and the associated threats. In particular, this refers to situations where there is a distortion of the information presented within the information space. The manipulation and dissemination of false information is widely used at the individual level and to escalate state conflicts. In the context of the threats mentioned above, efforts to increase the resilience and cohesion of Estonian society are presented. The development of psychological defence within civil society enables a more effective fight against manipulations and disinformation at the state level.[43]
A narrator from Tartu, Estonia, talks about the importance of a cohesive society in the fight against disinformation: „I don’t think misinformation is a problem in Estonia, thanks to our cohesion. In the context of what we had to endure during the occupation, we are well prepared for potential threats. It’s not just us „Estonians“, but also the Russians who have already integrated into society. I cannot speak for the rest, because I do not come into contact with these people, but I think that they are the target group for Russia’s attempt to gain power over Estonia.“
Activities to combat disinformation in the country
In the case of Estonia, cooperation from the population is perceived as one of the key elements of defence against threats related to influence on Estonia’s information space.
This has led, for example, to the establishment of the National Centre for Defence and Security Awareness (Riigikaitse ja julgeoleku teadmiskeskus). The main aim of the organisation is to raise awareness of security threats in Estonia. This is mainly done by organising workshops or by producing instructional publications aimed at Estonia’s young people. The programme is aimed at both Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking residents, which should lead to improved integration of young ethnic Russians into Estonian society.[44]
National Defence (Riigikaitseõpetus) is also taught at the national level. In the course, which lasts 140 hours, students are introduced to the basics of first aid or the functioning of the army, and several hours are devoted to the issue of hybrid threats in the form of misinformation and disinformation.[45]
When asked whether the narrator from Narva, Estonia, had participated in a similar event, he replies as follows: „I attended the lectures as part of Riigikaitseõpetus, because it was compulsory at school. I know it was controversial for some parents from less integrated families and they didn’t want their children to go. But we found it very interesting, and our teacher showed many examples of myths that had been debunked, such as the one about the murderous NATO soldier in Vilnius, Lithuania, but also the different types of combat vehicles that our army has.“
The citizens‘ initiative called Propastop is another in a series of projects aimed at exposing disinformation spread in the Estonian media space. Propastop is made up entirely of volunteers, many of whom are members of Kaitseliit[46] who try to remain anonymous. Investigative articles are in some cases picked up by Postimees, one of the most popular newspapers in the country[47].
The situation of the Sputnik news server in the country
The news website Sputnik began operating internationally in November 2014 as an offshoot of the state-owned media outlet Russia Today, and its office in Estonia was established in February 2016.[48]
One of the Estonian narrators participating in the research recalls the establishment of the Sputnik editorial office in Tallinn: „There was no big fuss about it, but when I talked about it with my friends, they immediately knew what was going on. Sputnik was already active in Latvia at that time, where they even tried to ban it. Although one could argue about its importance, because not many people read it, the fight against this type of media is symbolic.“
Sputnik’s activities in Estonia soon came under the scrutiny of local authorities. For example, during the second half of 2017, when Estonia held the EU presidency, Sputnik journalists were not granted accreditation. The reason for such a decision was a follow-up to a European Parliament report, when Sputnik was labelled as a supposed media agency that does not operate on the basis of independence. The Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation expressed great surprise at this approach.[49]
A narrator from Estonia comments on the approach of the authorities to the functioning of Sputnik in Estonia: „At the beginning of its functioning around 2016, there was a desire to promote the independence of the media at all costs, nobody wanted to regulate Sputnik because it was known that it would irritate the Russians. As time went on, it became unsustainable. Especially when there were attacks on constitutional officials, such as the then Minister of Education, through Sputnik.“
The situation has escalated to the current situation where Sputnik is prevented from publishing in Estonia. This type of measure is a consequence of the ownership structure of the media. It belongs to a group controlled by the person of Dimitry Kyselyov, who is under sanctions by the European Union because of his efforts to destabilise Ukraine. As a result of the sanctions, it is impossible for Sputnik to pay invoices in Estonia, which inevitably leads to the suspension of the activities of the alleged media outlet, which lasts from 1 January 2020. Measures of this kind also provoke reactions among respondents.
Narrator 13: „In Narva, it is addressed a bit more, because the Russian community watches Russian television, where topics are often discussed that focus on the Baltic States‘ oppression of freedom of speech.“
Narrator 14: „Russian politicians are using this to dramatize the situation, to show how oppressed the minority of Russians here is. In reality, however, it’s a pretty meaningless event, because hardly anyone reads Sputnik anyway, and it’s worse with the TV stations.“
Conclusion
The issue of the spread of disinformation and misinformation by the Russian Federation has been fully penetrating the expert discourse since the events in Ukraine in 2014. In the context of the Baltic States, the conflict in Ukraine can be considered an imaginary stepping stone in the fight against disinformation at the level of the European Union. It was Latvia that was at the origin of the NATO and EU crisis staffs, whose work led to the institutionalization of the Action Plan on Countering Disinformation, which is binding for all EU Member States. However, ordinary citizens are usually not able to navigate these efforts and often do not even know that their country is a leader in the fight against disinformation across the EU.
The fight against disinformation at national level takes different forms within the Baltic States. In Lithuania, there is a strong emphasis on the cooperation of experts from different sectors, whether it is individual major media outlets, strategic communication groups, IT experts or volunteers under the common name of Lithuanian Elves. It is often volunteer efforts that could be described as a more effective way of fighting than government regulations, where the population may feel that propaganda is being fought through the propaganda of others. However, the struggle of volunteers is difficult, and in addition, it can threaten the safety of individuals, as one narrator recounts. Not everyone, however, views such activities positively, seeing them as a subject for an article in the Western media rather than an effective solution to the problem. On the contrary, media literacy education in schools is seen as a suitable tool to combat disinformation.
A significant feature of the manipulative efforts disseminated through the media is the presentation of the ethnic minority of Russians in the Baltic States as a homogeneous entity. However, it is not possible to interpret the minority in question as a homogeneous whole and apply the influence only to it. In Lithuania, we identify the most vulnerable minority groups as Russians and Poles, but as the interviews with the narrators show, these minorities cannot be considered as completely homogeneous. On the contrary, it is necessary to focus also on radical movements within the existence of right-wing extremism in the country. Movements such as Law and Justice share positions on some of the issues propagated by pro-Kremlin information campaigns. For example, it can be mentioned in the form of attitudes towards sexual minorities.
The minorities of Russians living in Latvia and Estonia can be divided into several groups based on their degree of integration into the social life of the country. The most important group targeted by disinformation campaigns in Latvia are neutral Russians, i.e. people living on Latvian territory who are dissatisfied with state policy and their own economic situation. When confronted with other ethnic groups, however, they tend to hide these preferences, and the information sources used by them are taboo in informal conversation. Although there is a tendency for the Russian Federation to generalise the situation of minorities in the Baltics, it is also possible to encounter different attitudes within the family. Some representatives of the youngest generation in the family are fully integrated into Latvian society, while their parents and grandparents tend to be nostalgic for the Soviet Union and use information resources provided by the Russian Federation because they fit better into their worldview.
The themes of disinformation produced by agencies directly or indirectly linked to the Russian Federation are very flexible and adapt to current events to ensure greater credibility. Despite these facts, it is possible to identify frequently emerging narratives within the publications of the so-called alleged media.
Among the common narratives of pro-Kremlin disinformation websites operating in the Baltics is the undermining of the population’s trust in supranational organisations such as NATO and the European Union. Both organisations are portrayed by propaganda efforts in a way that is intended to instil fear in national populations about the future of their country in the event of a war conflict. Although all the states are full members of the EU and NATO, propaganda articles do not shy away from claims that the problems of the European Union are distant from the ordinary citizens of the Baltic States. In a similar vein, the participation of the states in NATO is discussed, where the organisation is described as an aggressor preparing a military conflict in the region, the aim of which is to attack the Russian Federation.
The topic of nationalism among the inhabitants of the Baltic States cannot be omitted. They are labelled as extremists with nationalist tendencies through fabricated narratives such as the claim that Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf is more popular than the fantasy books in the Harry Potter series. In addition to similar cultural attacks, the label of escalating nationalism in the country is used in the context of the Russian-speaking minority in the region or in connection with celebrations of the restoration of independence from the Soviet Union.
The disseminators of misleading news and misinformation can be classified into several categories, the most obvious being disinformation websites such as Sputnik, Baltnews and Baltijas Balss. The former is also referred to as an alleged news agency in the European Union’s official communication on the subject. The spread of disinformation can also be noted through official channels of the Russian Federation, such as the RIA Novosti agency, which is one of the most popular Internet sources in the region. A separate section is the dissemination of tendentious information through television broadcasting, which takes place mainly in the context of news bulletins that are largely taken from Russian television broadcasts.
The public’s view of disinformation campaigns cannot simply be generalised, but can be seen in the context of the target groups. As an example, the position of the parents and grandparents of the youngest narrators‘ generation, who, although not directly connected to the Russian Federation, may have a tendency towards nostalgia for the Soviet period, leading to a higher level of trust in information sources originating in the Russian Federation. Working with sources of information also plays an important role in people’s perception of disinformation campaigns, with disinformation media working with trusted brands such as Forbes magazine. This, combined with the relatively high rate of residents who admit to sharing content without a source, creates space for the narratives spread by disinformation media to take root.
[1] HENDL, Jan. Kvalitativní výzkum. s. 149–150
[2] Latvia Interest Group on Reddit, available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/latvia/
[3] Lithuania Interest Group on Reddit, available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/lithuania/
[4] Estonia Interest Group on Reddit, available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/Eesti/
[5] FELLOWS, Erwin W. ‚Propaganda‘: History of a Word. American Speech, 1959, 34.3: 182–183.
[6] PETRUSEK, Miloslav, Hana MAŘÍKOVÁ a Alena VODÁKOVÁ. Velký sociologický slovník. s. 865–866
[7] OATES, Sarah a Sean STEINER. Projecting Power.
[8] Disinformation. [online] OED online. December 2019 [cit. 1. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54579?redirectedFrom=disinformation
[9] Definice dezinformací a propagandy. [online] Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, 2019 [cit. 1. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/definice-dezinformaci-a-propagandy.aspx
[10] FLANDEROVÁ, Linda. Soft power: mít či nemít. Mezinárodní politika, 2013. [online] Ústav mezinárodních vztahů Praha. [cit. 19. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.iir.cz/article/soft-power-mit-ci-nemit
[11] NYE, Joseph S. Soft Power the Means to Success in World Politics. s. 10–15
[12] Zasedání Evropské rady (19. a 20. března 2015) – závěry [online]. [cit. 26. 2. 2020]. s. 5. Dostupné z: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21868/st00011cs15.pdf
[13] Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force. [online] EEAS. [cit. 26. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east-
[14] EVROPSKÝ PARLAMENT. Zpráva o strategické komunikaci EU s cílem bojovat proti propagandě, kterou proti ní vedou třetí strany (2016/2030(INI)) [online]. [cit. 8. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2016-0290_CS.pdf
[15] Action Plan against Disinformation. [online] : European Commission. [cit. 26. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf
[16] Lithuania National Threat Assessment 2019. Vilnius: Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2019 ISBN 978-609-412-162-3. Další dostupnost: https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-Gresmes-internetui-EN.pdf
[17] Russia does not accept the concept of ‘Soviet occupation’, after Estonia mulls claiming damages. [online] LRT English, 23. 9. 2019. [cit. 28. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1099996/russia-does-not-accept-the-concept-of-soviet-occupation-after-estonia-mulls-claiming-damages
[18] National Threat Assessment 2019, s. 44
[19] The EU approved action plan against disinformation. [online] President of The Republic of Lithuania 14. 12. 2018. [cit. 28. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/the-eu-approved-action-plan-against-disinformation/31559
[20] About Debunk: Debunking disinformation together [online]. [cit. 28. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://debunk.eu/about-debunk/
[21] Narátorka naráží vojenskou přítomnost Ruska v Kaliningradské oblasti
[22] Patikrinta 15min: Apie projektą. [online] 15min.lt. [cit. 29. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.15min.lt/patikrinta-15min/apie
[23] Media and information literacy education project in Lithuania. [online] Nordic Council of Ministers Office in Lithuania. [cit. 29. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.norden.lt/en/projects/media-and-information-literacy-education-project-in-lithuania-2/
[24] Around the Bloc: Lithuanian Elves Do Battle With Russian Trolls. Transitions Online, 2016, 03/29: 41-42.
[25] Slangové označení pro ruskou společnost „Agentstvo intěrnět-issledovanij“ (v originále: Агентство интернет-исследований)
[26] RTR Planeta suspended in Lithuania for a year over incitement to war and hatred. [online] Delfi.lt 14. 2. 2018. [cit. 3. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://en.delfi.lt/culture/rtr-planeta-suspended-in-lithuania-for-a-year-over-incitement-to-war-and-hatred.d?id=77174217
[27] Lithuania’s decision to suspend broadcast of the Russian language channel „RTR Planeta“ complies with EU rules. [online] European Commission 8. 5. 2018. [cit. 3. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/lithuanias-decision-suspend-broadcast-russian-language-channel-rtr-planeta-complies-eu-rules
[28] NOSOVIČ, Alexander. The Americans are Considering Excluding the Baltics from NATO [online] 12. 1. 2016. [cit. 29. 2. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.rubaltic.ru/articles/baltics-go-home-12012016/
[29] LYSICIN, Anton. „Krupnějšaja perebroska vojsk.“ Čto dělajut u granic Belorussii tanki SŠA. [online]. RIA Novosti, 24. 10. 2019 [cit. 1. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://ria.ru/20191024/1560131856.html
[30] NATO Exercises. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [online]. 19. 2. 2020 [cit. 1. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://shape.nato.int/nato-exercises
[31] Žiniasklaida: JAV kariai nuplėšė Lietuvos vėliavą nuo Kauno prokuratūros pastato. [online] Sputniknews.lt, 6. 1. 2019 [cit. 1. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://sputniknews.lt/society/20190106/8002357/ziniasklaida-usa-kariai-nuplese-lithuania-veliava-nuo-kauno-prokuraturos-pastato.html?fbclid=IwAR2rbbEE5NjTaXCCZRsSja_2DH80UEumoD-_AHWT8_cbjbboXvvgO2VFxeU
[32] LT MFA. New year, same old pro-#Kremlin fakes:. In: Twitter [online]. 7. 1. 2019 [cit. 1. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://twitter.com/LT_MFA_Stratcom/status/1082255481761087489?s=20
[33] Indicators characterising languages used by the population of Latvia. [online] Centralas statistikas parvaldes datubazes. [cit. 1. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistics/statistics-by-theme/population/characteristics/key-indicator/indicators-characterising-languages-used
[34] National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (2016 – ). [online] Aizsardzības ministrija, s. 17-18 [cit. 2. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.mod.gov.lv/sites/mod/files/document/NDK_ENG_final.pdf
[35] ROSTOKS, Toms a Nora VANAGA. Latvia’s Security and Defence Post-2014. s. 89
[36] KUDORS, Andis. Latvia. In: Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe. [online] [cit. 22. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf
[37] Krisalps refers to similar situations as maintaining a vodka culture.
[38] ĒVALDE, Ieva. Vietējie nevar konkurēt ar Lietuvas milžiem: ordeņus joprojām izgatavos kaimiņos. [online]. LA.lv 5. 2. 2020 [cit. 5. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.la.lv/ordenus-joprojam-izgatavos-lietuva
[39] Latvijas Avīze pečalitsja: gordost‘ Latvii proizvodjat v Litve. [Latvijas Avīze печалится: гордость Латвии производят в Литве]. [online]. Baltijas Balss, 4. 3. 2020 [cit. 5. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://bb.lv/statja/nasha-latvija/2020/03/04/latvijas-avze-pechalitsya-gordost-latvii-proizvodyat-v-litve
[40] Hitler’s ‚Mein Kampf‘ More Popular Than Harry Potter on Latvian Book Site. [online] Sputnik International, 2. 4. 2018 [cit. 5. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://sputniknews.com/viral/201804021063142332-hitler-book-popular-harry-potter-latvia/
[41] Do Latvians really read more Hitler than Harry Potter? [online]. BBC News 9. 10. 2019 [cit. 5. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-49973668/do-latvians-really-read-more-hitler-than-harry-potter
[42] Flash Eurobarometer 464: Fake News and Disinformation Online. [online] European Commission: PublicOpinion, 2018. [cit. 26. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/surveyKy/2183
[43] National Security Concept 2017. [online] Republic of Estonia Government Office. [cit. 6. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.riigikantselei.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/Failid/national_security_concept_2017.pdf
[44] NCDSA Activities. National Centre of Defence & Security Awareness [online]. [cit. 7. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.kaitsen.ee/ncdsa-eng/
[45] Riigikaitseõpetuse Ainekavast. Kaitseressursside Amet [online]. [cit. 7. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.kra.ee/riigikaitseopetus/riigikaitseopetuse-ainekavast/
[46] Estonian Army Volunteer Group
[47] What is Propastop? [online] Propastop. [cit. 7. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://www.propastop.org/eng/2017/03/06/what-is-propastop/
[48] Russia’s Sputnik launches news portal in Estonia. [online] ERR News, 25. 2. 2016 [cit. 8. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://news.err.ee/117694/russia-s-sputnik-launches-news-portal-in-estonia
[49] Estonia denies entry to journalists of Russian state news agency. [online] ERR News, 30. 8. 2017 [cit. 8. 3. 2020]. Dostupné z: https://news.err.ee/615663/estonia-denies-entry-to-journalists-of-russian-state-news-agency
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